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 This dissertation explores the economics of regulation prior to and after 1980 in 
the United States. During the golden age of capitalism, regulation consisted of a set of 
rules of conduct that imposed mutually binding, socially beneficial restrictions on 
economic competition. It was widely believed this regulation would sanction those 
inclined to act opportunistically, making it possible for individual capitalists to act on 
their enlightened (rather than short-term opportunistic) self-interest. Confidence in the 
effectiveness of regulation was a commitment device, which allowed individual 
capitalists to act in concert with their collective class interests. However, the process of 
deregulation that began around 1980 gradually gave rise to an environment where free 
riding on others’ cooperation became the dominant strategy. The dissertation revisits the 
theory of the State to highlight the role played by regulatory institutions with respect to 
the agency of the capitalist class. An analytical framework models the intensity of 
regulation as a commitment device that increases the likelihood of successful collective 
action. Theoretical predictions indicate that because deregulation is individually 
profitable in the short run, it makes collective action more difficult overall as capitalists 
act opportunistically. The empirical dimension of this research explores the State’s 
relative autonomy, which is necessary if regulation is to be a credible commitment 
device. Empirical findings indicate that the relationship between the State and the rate of 




before. The empirical results, consistent with predictions of the analytic model and 
descriptive analysis, suggest that the relative autonomy of the State before 1980 and lack 





























As long as everything goes well, competition acts […] as a practical freemasonry[1] of the 
capitalist class, so that they all share in the common booty in proportion to the size of the 
portion that each puts in. But as soon as it is no longer a question of division of profit, but 
rather of loss, each seeks as far as he can to restrict his own share of this loss and pass it 
on to someone else. For the class as a whole, the loss is unavoidable. But how much each 
individual member has to bear, the extent to which he has to participate in it, now 
becomes a question of strength and cunning, and competition now becomes a struggle of 
enemy brothers. The opposition between the interest of each individual capitalist and that 
of the capitalist class as a whole now comes into its own, in the same way as competition 
was previously the instrument through which the identity of capitalists’ interests was 
asserted.  
—Karl Marx, Capital, Volume III 
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1.1 Introduction and Literature 
There is general agreement among economists that the period after the Second 
World War lasting into the early 1970s was characterized by broad economic prosperity 
in the United States. As early as 1980, economist Martin Feldstein observed that “[t]he 
first two decades of the postwar period were a time of unsurpassed economic prosperity, 
stability, and optimism (Feldstein 1980, p.1).” During this period, growth in real GNP 
(3.9 percent), growth in productivity per hour (3.7 percent), the rate of unemployment 
(4.7 percent), and the rate of inflation (2 percent) were indicative also of widely shared 
economic success in the foreseeable future.
2
  
Not only was the average worker thriving during the postwar period,
3
 but so too 
was the capitalist class. One economy-wide measure of the profit rate – roughly defined 
as corporate profits relative to the capital stock – averaged 17.7 percent from 1948 to 
1969, compared with 15.3 percent from 1980 to 2012.
4
 Despite Marx’s expectation that
                                                 
2
 Statistics from Feldstein (1980). 
3
 Relatively speaking, of course, within capitalist relations of production. 
4
 Author calculation using BEA data for 11 NAICS industries. See Appendix B for graphs. From 1970-
1979 the profit rate averaged 16.1 percent. These measures are consistent with Dumenil and Levy (1994), 
updated in 2013, who find that the aggregate rate of profit from 1948-1969 averaged 20.5 percent, from 




competition within the capitalist class would lead to impoverished social conditions,
5
 the 
economic data instead suggest a broad alignment between private interests and general 
public welfare – an era indicative of an economic “golden age.” 
The factors underlying this economic success are less straightforward than the 
data suggest. Different views have been put forward to explain the postwar golden age of 
capitalism without yet any consensus. Locating the success in various political 
compromises between classes, one branch of literature places the focus on institutions set 
in place after the Great Depression. According to this view, a set of distinct postwar 
accords between the government, capitalists, and workers underpinned robust growth in 
corporate profitability and investment by creating a mix of competition, cooperation, and 
stability in the economy (Bowles et al. 1986; Gordon et al. 1983; Gordon et al. 1987; 
Reich 2008). These accords became dysfunctional during the 1970s when new economic 
realities and class conflict could no longer be reconciled with the institutions they 
supported (Kotz 1987; McDonough et al 2010; Lippit 2014). Yet the precise mechanism 
that tamed competition, engendering cooperation has been left inadequately developed 
within this literature. 
Others suggested that postwar economic prosperity was due in part to the 
institutionalized alignment between mass production and consumption after the Great 
Depression in the United States (Piore and Sabel 1984; Lipietz 1986). Noting that the 
postwar economy was characterized by an intensive regime of capital accumulation (i.e., 
mass production) combined with a monopolist mode of regulation, Aglietta (1979) and 
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 “Capital asks no questions about the length of life of labor-power. What interests it is purely and simply 
the maximum of labor-power that can be set in motion in a working day. It attains this objective by 
shortening the life of labor-power, in the same way as a greedy farmer snatches more produce from the soil 




Jessop (1995) suggested that widely distributed economic gains contributed to high levels 
of aggregate spending. During the golden age, compromises between classes with respect 
to the distribution of economic surplus, far from constricting profitability and investment, 
gave rise to prosperity.
6
  
A newly emergent body of work explores how institutions – encompassing those 
broadly defined to include worker rights and safety, environmental, financial, as well as 
industry-level regulation – support the pursuit of enlightened self-interest for various 
economic actors. Enlightened self-interest is the recognition that what is collectively 
beneficial can also be individually beneficial provided that the costs of cooperation are 
equally distributed.  
Recent literature on economic governance (Williamson 1979, 1981, 2005; Dixit 
2004, 2009; Scott 2011, 2012) has attempted to articulate ways to engender unification of 
various interests among economic actors – that is, to support enlightened self-interest in a 
competitive economy. By striking a balance between private interests (e.g., robust capital 
accumulation) and public welfare (e.g., gain of the average worker), governance 
institutions represent a system of activities or structures designed “to achieve collective 
goals through the benefits of collaboration and the costs of sanctions” (Wilke and Wilke 
2012). Ugur and Sunderland write that “‘institutions as governance structures’ are a 
system of rules that enable economic actors to avoid sub-optimal [sic] collective action 
outcomes” (Ugur and Sunderland 2011, p.4).  These systems-of-rules have the potential 
to support a common unity among agents who have heterogeneous and conflicting 
interests by serving as a commitment device (Schelling 1981) – a mechanism around 
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which a convention of cooperation can be nurtured and maintained. For instance, by 
using “law” (a formal institution) as a commitment device, Acemoglu and Jackson 
demonstrate how cooperative norms and other informal institutions evolve in response to 
its effectiveness (Acemoglu and Jackson 2014). They find that when informal institutions 
are in conflict with laws, the commitment device fails in its intended effect of 
engendering lawful behavior. Dixit (2014) employs a similar model that examines 
collective action in the business community. When agents are symmetric in their capacity 
to impose sanctions on cheating members, both formal and informal institutions can be 
effectively used in combination to enhance the fight of corruption. When agents are not 
symmetric in their retaliatory capacity, however, collective action is more problematic. 
Korkut Erturk, for instance, finds that asymmetric power alters the effectiveness of such 
commitment devices at the level of individual exchange (Erturk 2011, 2015), as well as at 
the level of the macroeconomy (Erturk 2012).   
That macroeconomic and other national institutions provided a space for 
collective action for the “corporate elite” is a central theme in Mizruchi (2013). Serving 
as a platform where political consensus could be built on a variety of important issues – 
including those potentially divisive within the capitalist class
7
 – institutions during the 
golden age prevented capitalists’ collective class interest (i.e., enlightened self-interest) 
from being jeopardized by their own narrow interest for private gain.  
According to Mizruchi, the demise during the early 1980s of these consensus-
building institutions was due in part to an increase in economic power of capitalists 
relative to the government and workers. This allowed the elite to discontinue any 
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 Whitt (1980) also explores the potential for cooperation between capitalists using case studies from the 




constructive accommodation of labor and to push an agenda of limited government, “two 
of the primary structures that had sustained [the corporate elite’s] moderate post-war 
orientation, as well as its ability to act collectively to address its shared concerns” 
(Mizruchi 2013, p.179).  Financial institutions and banks “also occasionally played a role 
in disciplining individual capitalists who engaged in erratic or deviant behavior (Mizruchi 
2013, p.6).” In a similar vein, Thomas McGarity documents the decline in the 
effectiveness of formal institutions since 1980 (regulatory law in particular), concluding 
that a new social bargain is needed that restores the State’s “capacity to steer the conduct 
of large economic institutions in socially desirable directions” (McGarity 2013, p.275).  
 There is ample historical evidence that members of the capitalist class were aware 
of the potential value of governmental regulation and similar institutions in creating a 
check on individual opportunism. A 1971 report titled The Social Responsibilities of 
Business Corporations published by the Committee for Economic Development (CED 
henceforth) is a case in point. Government regulation, the report suggested, opened a 
space for “corporate social responsibility” that could help circumvent the suboptimal 
provision of social and collective goods – the costs of which each capitalist must share – 
thereby making everyone better off. 
Written by a motley assortment of the political and economic elite during the late 
1960s and early 1970s, the report focused on the large corporations that “bear the burden 
of leadership within the business community” (CED 1971, p.9ff) in the United States. In 
addition to suggesting that the enlightened self-interest of the business corporation can 
“promote the public welfare in a positive way,” the report goes on to list several ways 




is inexorably involved in the well-being of the society of which business is an integral 
part, and from which it draws the basic requirements needed for it to function at all – 
capital, labor, customers” (CED 1971,p.27). Not coincidentally, the period during which 
this report was written was also one of relatively robust working class power. 
 The report was motivated by two concerns. One was raising profitability as well 
as public welfare through the pursuit of enlightened self-interest by capitalists, while the 
other involved reducing the threat of pernicious governmental regulation, which could 
materialize if the corporate community did not act in a socially responsible way. 
According to the report, enlightened self-interest included  
expenditures to help improve community educational, health, and cultural 
facilities [that] can be justified by the corporation's interest in attracting 
the skilled people it needs [...] The doctrine of enlightened self-interest is 
also based on the proposition that if business does not accept a fair 
measure of responsibility for social improvement, the interests of the 
corporation may actually be jeopardized (CED 1971, p.28-29). 
 
To support a unified capitalist class in their pursuit of enlightened self-interest, the report 
suggested that government regulation play an integral part because it allows for 
commitment to various social expenditures by inspiring the confidence that others are 
likewise contributing their fair share. The authors thus recognized (and, as a focal point, 
it is plausible to assume it was widely recognized by others as well) that regulation 
functioned as a commitment device through which firms could achieve a cooperative, 
jointly beneficial outcome. Individual capitalists, in other words, were enabled in their 
pursuit of enlightened self-interest by obviating the concern that others were acting 
opportunistically. In a memorandum included toward the end of the report, economist 




Enlightened self-interest is a highly desirable objective for business but it 
is not a major alternative to the role of government. It must be recognized 
that the very nature of a competitive economy renders governmental 
intervention and regulation not only inevitable but proper. [...] It is the 
very essence of vigorous competition which necessitates some 
authoritative setting down of rules that maximize the fulfillment of public 
interest. [...] The issue is not one of avoiding governmental or social 
sanctions. Rather, it is one of not only acquiescing in needed and 
reasonable regulations, but also of seeking constructive regulations while 
at the same time objecting to regulations that are more restrictive than 
necessary (CED 1971, p.69f, italics added). 
 
Overall, the tenor of the report reflected the general economic optimism and the concern 
with social unrest characteristic of the late 1960s and early 1970s. With equal measures 
of confidence and vigilance, its authors suggested that “[t]he goals of American society 
can be realized only through a massive, cooperative effort of government, industry, labor, 
and education” (p.51) and that “regulatory measures are essential in many fields to insure 
[sic] that all businesses, not only the financially strong and more socially responsible 
ones, act in accordance with the public interest” (CED 1971, p.58). This same idea has 
been articulated more recently in work by Gar Alperovitz (2011, p.56) and by James 
Galbraith, the latter of whom noted that “regulation is the competitive instrument of the 
more progressive part of the business community, which wishes – for its own advantage 
– to force everyone to play by a common set of rules” (Galbraith 2008, p.129f). 
 Yet not all those writing on institutions agreed with the CEDs pragmatic 
approach, seeing instead the government and its regulatory apparatus as a cause of 
economic decline. Feldstein (1980), along with other prominent economists at the time, 
put much of the blame for poor economic performance from the mid-1970s onward on 
too much government in the economy. One branch of the literature that developed from 




decline in key measures of economic performance during the 1970s. A theoretical 
explanation for this correlation was offered by Mancur Olson (1982), who suggested that 
the growth of economic coalitions and government regulation provided incentives for 
capturing national income more so than its increase. The thrust of Olson’s argument was 
that as countries age they accumulate distributional coalitions, the members of which 
become intent on pursuing their narrow objectives as opposed to broader public goals.
8
 
These coalitions in his view become entrenched in the bureaucracy of mature institutions, 
diminishing the productivity of the economy.  
 Olson’s basic approach to understanding dysfunctional institutions remains 
influential today. In a recent book, Ferguson (2013) looked at the way in which 
regulatory institutions restrict the capacity for economic growth and stability. Ferguson 
suggests that overly complex regulations in conjunction with lax enforcement (and non-
punishment) explain why economic institutions are today dysfunctional. His solution is to 
simplify regulation and to strengthen substantially enforcement, raising penalties for 
running afoul of the rules (Ferguson 2013, p.74ff). Writing from a different literature 
(political science), Peter Schuck reaches the same conclusion. He suggests that voluntary 
regulatory compliance combined with a threat of punishment sufficient to deter violations 
are both important preconditions for institutional autonomy and successful regulatory 
outcomes when government programs interact significantly with market processes 
(Schuck 2014, p.226). Interestingly, the solutions proposed by Ferguson and Schuck are a 
throwback to the “make business follow its enlightened self-interest” doctrine of the 1971 
CED report. They do not, however, address the complications that arise from “regulatory 
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capture,” that is, what happens when regulatory institutions lose their autonomy with 
respect to the private interests they are supposed to regulate. 
 A recent empirical literature delves more deeply into the relationship between 
institutions and economic performance (growth) from an historical and comparative 
perspective (Knack and Keefer 1995; Rodrik 1999; Acemoglu and Johnson 2005). This 
literature explores the role of institutions in economic prosperity by raising intriguing 
questions with respect to the manner in which differences in economic or political power 
enhance or stifle this potential for growth. A question of endogeneity lies near the center 
of this research program. Do institutions increase economic growth or do economic 
conditions create and sustain a variety of successful institutions? On one hand, it is 
recognized that “[e]conomic institutions matter for economic growth because they shape 
the incentives of key economic actors in society” (Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson 
2004, p.2). On the other, this relationship “may reflect the reverse influence of economic 
growth on institutions or the simultaneous influence of omitted variables on both 
economic output and institutions” (Albouy 2012).   
In a widely cited paper, Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001) attempt to 
overcome the endogeneity problem by using the concept of “settler mortality” as an 
instrumental variable for institutions. Looking at areas of North America settled by 
Europeans, the authors find that two distinct sets of conditions emerged because of 
differential rates of mortality. In areas of colonization with a high mortality rate, 
extractive institutions evolved due to the rush to extract wealth as quickly as possible. At 
odds with broad-based economic growth and development, these institutions also tended 




In geographic areas more conducive to long-term settlement (i.e., lower mortality rates), 
investments in infrastructure were more pronounced and systems to protect property 
rights led to a more effective constraint on those holding economic and political power. 
The latter underlying institutions persisted through time, ultimately leading to two 
distinct paths of economic growth and development.
9
  
 As noted, the distribution of economic power is an important determinant with 
respect to which institutions emerge because substantial concentration of power can at 
best engender institutions which are socially inefficient, and at worst, those which 
maximize the private income of those holding power at the social expense (Acemoglu et 
al. 2004, p.3ff). Yet, institutions can also function as a constraint on economic power if 
they develop in a way that assigns power to those with an interest in distributed 
prosperity or economic growth more broadly. Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2005) 
explore this latter idea in terms of the differential institutional and economic development 
of nations with access to Atlantic trade from those without. Their central finding is that 
an expanding global market and base for economic growth was linked with the rise of 
institutions favoring “nonabsolutist” rulers over the period 1500 to 1850. They suggest 
that not all nations with access to the Atlantic followed the same pattern of economic 
growth, however, and hypothesize “that Atlantic trade generated large profits for 
commercial interests in favor of institutional change in countries that met two crucial 
preconditions: easy access to the Atlantic and nonabsolutist initial institutions” 
(Acemoglu et al. 2005, p.562).  One conclusion to be drawn from this literature is that 
                                                 
9




some degree of circular feedback between power, economic growth, and institutions 
accompanies economic development. 
 
1.2 Contribution of this Dissertation 
 This dissertation is a contribution within a general institutional approach. In 
contrast to the literature on institutions, however, the research attempts to locate more 
precisely the institutional mechanisms supporting enlightened self-interest. The thesis is 
that in the face of intense capitalist competition during the golden age, regulatory 
institutions of the State functioned as a commitment device, allowing capitalists to act in 
their enlightened (as opposed to narrow) self-interest. Of course, the capitalist class unity 
engendered by this commitment device was not immune from changing social conditions. 
It was new social and economic conditions that emerged during the 1970s that prompted 
the capitalist class to push for economic and regulatory reforms, effectively dismantling 
the commitment device. One such reform (discussed below) was a massive restructuring 
of State institutions, embodied in the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978. These and other 
reforms, in conjunction with a deregulatory economic program introduced in the late 
1970s and early 1980s, succeeded in raising individual capitalists’ rate of profit not so 
much through improved economic performance as through increasing their power vis-a-
vis labor and the government, but also fragmented their unity in the process (c.f. 
Mizruchi 2013). Not surprisingly, with the weakening of the regulatory apparatus of the 
State, the pursuit of enlightened self-interest gradually gave way to free riding on others’ 
cooperation as the dominant business strategy. James Galbraith saw this as the purpose 




regulatory framework on which a public purpose depends” (Galbraith 2008, p.131). Yet, 
in addition to a comparatively lower average profit rate, one unintended consequence 
was the erosion of the elite's capacity to act in its collective class interest, let alone the 
public interest.  
With the fragmentation of the economic elite, the divergence between private 
profit and social welfare – a feature prominent prior to the First World War in advanced 
capitalist countries – reemerged. As each individual capitalist now acts on their narrow 
(as opposed to enlightened) self-interest, collective economic costs – financial crises, 
environmental, health and welfare of labor, and so forth, have begun to mount. Although 
such costs are shouldered mostly by citizens, one of their underlying causes is the 
disunity of the capitalist class; it is an important source of political and economic 
dysfunction in the economy today.
10
 
This research explores what accounts for the State’s ability to provide capitalists 
with a commitment device that ensures that acting on one’s enlightened self-interest pays 
off. It revisits the theory of the State from this particular angle and emphasizes the 
importance of the autonomy of regulatory institutions in supporting a unified capitalist 
class. Building on previous theoretical work in club theory (e.g., Buchanan 1965), the 
research conceptualizes the State as a “club” (Erturk 2012), having the potential to unify 
capitalists and prevent free riding on the collective costs stemming from capital 
accumulation (c.f. Whitt 1980). As suggested in the epigraph above, competition can in 
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 Several factions of the capitalist class have been experiencing record profitability in recent years in spite 
of these rising collective costs. This does not mean that the accumulation of such costs is consistent with 
their enlightened self-interest, as the full economic effects of recurrent financial crises and of 




fact engender unity if the former is well regulated; that is, the boundaries of competition 
are well known and enforced. 
A game-theoretic model is developed with respect to the way in which the 
intensity of regulation functions as a commitment device (i.e., boundary), thereby 
increasing the number of willing cooperators. Well-defined and enforced regulatory 
boundaries are important for preventing free riding on collective costs, as well as in 
apportioning costs among club members while excluding outsiders from sharing in the 
benefits of cooperation. Club boundaries can thus take the form of national borders and 
regulatory rules and institutions, including restrictions on capital mobility. Along with the 
weakening of national boundaries, regulatory institutions lost credibility and 
effectiveness in the early 1980s, and without that, neoliberal “capitalism entailed little 
capacity to organize corrective collective action for the costs it externalized (Erturk 2012, 
p.4).” Profitable collective action, in other words, became much more problematic as 
individual capitalists no longer believed the regulatory apparatus was a credible, binding 
constraint.  
The dissertation fills an empirical gap in the literature on the State and its relative 
autonomy from capitalist competition.
11
 It empirically estimates the relationship between 
the political composition of the State and the rate of profit in eleven United States 
industries. Since the State’s relative autonomy with respect to individual capitalists 
determines the credibility of the commitment device, it also determines overall 
cooperation in the economy. Findings indicate that the relationship between the industry 
rates of profit and the State composition changed significantly after 1980 compared to the 
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 Appropriately, Nicos Poulantzas (1973) used the term “isolation” to refer to capitalist competition, a term 




period before. This supports the view that the autonomy of the State before and its 
erosion after might have been an important causal factor in the success and decline of the 
golden age of capitalism.  The empirical findings presented are consistent with 
predictions of the analytic model with respect to the economic impact of regulation. 
 
1.3 Organization of the Dissertation 
 The remainder of this dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 2 develops the 
intuition behind the endogeneity of institutions with respect to regulating market 
behavior. It is suggested that regulation stems from class conflict, and that under certain 
conditions the local-level institutions (face-to-face interactions and community sanctions 
and norms) need not be considered too dissimilar from those at the national-level 
(regulatory boundaries) in terms of how they can underlie successful collective action, 
provided the latter are free from capture.  
 Chapter 3 expands on the depiction of the State as a club and discusses the club 
theory literature more broadly to motivate the argument of the demise of successful 
collective action after 1980. A game-theoretic model is developed in this chapter to 
formalize the discussion.  A side effect of regulation’s diminished effectiveness was 
increased tax evasion, which undermined capitalists’ once effective solution in dealing 
with their collective costs. This also caused enhanced re-regulation in the economy as its 
relative payoff increased, ultimately leading to increased regulatory capture, or at least 
the perception thereof. 
This contrasts with much of the economic literature on regulation that 




as opposed to the failures of markets as well as institutions. Providing a critical review of 
this literature, Chapter 4 bridges the theoretical discussion with the empirical model and 
findings of the dissertation reported in Chapter 5, assessing the State’s relative autonomy. 







THE ORIGIN OF THE STATE AND ENDOGENOUS  
REGULATORY INSTITUTIONS 
 
2.1 Regulation and Class Conflict 
Shaped by economic power and social conditions, institutions regulating 
competition often develop endogenously within an economic system (Acemoglu et al. 
2001; Acemoglu et al. 2004; Acemoglu et al. 2005; Engerman and Sokoloff 2000; Greif, 
Milgrom, and Weingast 1994; Greif 2006). According to Karl Marx, regulatory 
institutions of the capitalist State are determined by class conflict. Marx writes, “[t]he 
establishment of a normal working-day is the result of centuries of struggle between the 
capitalist and the worker” (Marx 1992, p.382). In addition to the well-known notion of an 
institutional accord thought to be struck between the government, capitalists, and 
workers, the idea that regulation is endogenous can help explain more explicitly the 
mechanism producing a “moderation of inter-capitalist rivalry” (Gordon et al. 1987, 
p.50).  
The political organization of the class interest of capitalists is accomplished best 
when the working class is strong enough to counter balance capitalist power. The ability 
of the capitalist class to organize collective agency relies upon the emergence of 





function of the relative balance of power between economic classes. Marx wrote in the 
preface to Capital,  
Apart from any higher motives, then, the most basic interests of the 
present ruling classes dictate to them that they clear out of the way all 
legally removable obstacles to the development of the working class. For 
this reason, among others, I have devoted a great deal of space in this 
volume to the history, the details, and the results of the English factory 
legislation (Marx 1992, p.92).  
 
Marx writes later in the same volume of Capital that 
Factory legislation, that first conscious and methodical reaction of society 
against the spontaneously developed form of its production process, is, as 
we have seen, just as much the necessary product of large scale industry 
as cotton yarn, self-actors and the electric telegraph (Marx 1992, p.610, 
italics added). 
 
By “self-actors” Marx meant the intersection of individual capitalists and the laws of 
competition by which they are governed. These laws, originating as a byproduct of 
industry, were critical for private accumulation and for the maintenance of the average 
worker. By generating high social costs and other losses that each capitalist sought to 
avoid, too much competition between capitalists came to harm society.
12
 Thus, factory 
legislation was the first conscious effort to regulate capitalist competition to constrain its 
socially harmful effects.  
Marx saw factory legislation as collectively beneficial to the capitalist class 
because it was in their interest to abide by a uniform set of rules that circumscribed self-
interest when harmful for all. Although regulation did place an upper limit on the length 
of the working day, the drawback of generalized factory regulation from the perspective 
of the working class is that it sped the concentration of capital and the overall 
development of the factory system (Marx 1992, p.635). “But by doing this,” wrote Marx, 
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“it also generalizes the direct struggle against its rule. While in each individual workshop 
it enforces uniformity, [… the effect of] regulation of the working day is to increase the 
anarchy and the proneness to catastrophe of capitalist production as a whole” (Marx 
1992, p. 635). While solving one of capitalists’ collective action problems (uniformity of 
competition), factory legislation of the working day also opened two others. 
Nevertheless, collective agency was made easier for individual capitalists once the drive 
for accumulation (valorization of surplus) had been restrained by working class power. 
Marx again used the word “reaction” to describe the social response to collective costs.13 
The immoderate lengthening of the working-day produced by machinery 
in the hands of capital leads later on to a reaction on the part of society, 
which is threatened in the very sources of its life; and, from there, to a 
normal working day whose length is fixed by law (Marx 1992, p.533). 
 
Regulation stemming from working class power was embodied in the Factory Acts, 
acting as a counterpoise to capitalist power. By tempering the destructive aspects of 
capital accumulation and competition, the Acts were in fact an attempt to regulate 
society's common pool resources (i.e., health and education of labor power)
14
, which 
benefit the capitalist class as a whole. Capitalist’s 
unmeasured drive for self-valorization, shortens the life of the individual 
worker, and therefore the duration of his labor power [...] It would seem 
therefore that the interest of capital itself points in the direction of a 




By moderating competition and conflict, this regulation worked as a commitment device 
in the language of modern game theory as it ensured that all capitalists could have 
confidence that no one could skirt the social and economic rules that constrained the 
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pursuit of self-interest and profit. The significance of the Ten-Hours Bill in England, 
according to Marx, was that it unified capitalists’ interests. Marx writes, 
Nevertheless, the principle had triumphed with its victory in those great 
branches of industry which form the most characteristic creation of the 
modern mode of production. Their wonderful development from 1853 to 
1860, hand-in-hand with the physical and moral regeneration of the 
factory workers, was visible to the weakest eyes (Marx 1992, p.408). 
 
The “principle” here referred to the balance of power between the working class and the 
bourgeoisie, while “[t]heir wonderful development” referred to the Factory Acts.16 
Although reflecting a variety of social and economic conditions, the economic regulation 
of competition that supported capitalist class unity was determined in the last instance by 
the extent to which the working class could erect barriers to its own exploitation in the 
production process. This benefited the capitalist class by making it easier to spell out and 
enforce the rules that promote the beneficial use of common pool resources. Marx’s view 
on this can best be seen in the final portion of the following quote on the Factory Acts: 
The necessity for a generalization of the Factory Acts, for transforming 
them from exceptional laws relating to mechanical spinning and weaving 
— those first creations of machinery — into the general law for all social 
production, arose, as we have seen, from the path of historical 
development taken by large scale industry. […] There are two 
circumstances that finally turn the scale [against capitalist excess]: first, 
the constantly recurring experience that as soon as capital is subjected to 
state control, even at a handful of points on the periphery of society, it 
seeks compensation all the more unrestrainedly at all other points; and 
second, the cry of the capitalists for equality in the conditions of 
competition, i.e., the equality of restraint on the exploitation of labor 
(Marx 1992, p.621, italics added). 
 
The opportunistic exploitation of labor is a case in point of a disunified capitalist 
class (or club, as will be developed in the next chapter). The task of regulation, then, is to 
hold individuals to their enlightened self-interest. Yet when regulatory institutions cannot 
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or do not rein in opportunism, society’s common pool resources (e.g., labor power) are 
subject to over-extraction, a classic collective action problem. The health and education 
of labor power are examples of the collective costs that must be shared by the capitalist 
class as a whole, and it is in the enlightened self-interest of capitalists to husband and 
protect these resources. However, recognizing their enlightened self-interest is different 
from their ability to act on it, given that the latter requires unified collective action. 
Acting on their enlightened self-interest depends in part on the capacity of the State’s 
regulatory institutions to keep individual capitalists in check. This, in turn, depends on 
the State’s relative autonomy from individual capitalists.  
All of this is not to say, however, that a unified capitalist class does not exploit the 
working class or that social welfare can ever be maximized under capitalism. Indeed, the 
capitalist mode of production is built on profit, which represents the extraction of surplus 
value from labor due to the divergence between the use-value and the exchange-value of 
labor power. Two contradictory tendencies thus result from regulation of the capitalist 
factory system. On one hand, regulation equalizes the competitive conditions for 
capitalists with respect to extracting surplus value and thus speeds the accumulation 
process. On the other hand, regulation organizes the working class through a more 
generalizable struggle against capital. 
 
2.2 Recent Neoclassical Literature on Institutions 
Although delving much more deeply into the actions of atomistic individuals, 
more recent neoclassical theory of State institutions borrows much from Marx’s original 




[t]he purpose of institutions […] is to induce individuals to take 
cooperative or honest actions that achieve and sustain mutually beneficial 
outcomes in their economic interactions, countering the temptation of each 
individual to take opportunistic or cheating actions that promote his 
interest at the expense of the aggregate good (Dixit 2004, p.59).  
 
Coinciding with the rise of transaction-cost economics (e.g., Coase 1937, 1960; 
Williamson 1979, 1981, 2005), there has been a resurgence in the literature over the last 
two decades with respect to the capacity for institutions to govern competition in a way 
that promotes the common good. This “new institutionalist” literature places focus on 
two basic categories for understanding the way private agents address collectively the 
costs of competition, broadly falling under the headings of private-order and public-
order institutions.   
Private-order institutions – like those used successfully by ancient traders to 
manage enforcement costs and to promote collective action (Greif, Milgrom, and 
Weingast 1994; Greif 2006) – can be highly efficient in regulating competition because 
of their context-specific attributes. Due to the potential costs of using a formal legal 
system (Dixit 2004, p.25), however, these private-order institutions consist of norms and 
sanctions that operate largely outside of formal political organization. The effectiveness 
of private-order institutions is constrained by group size. As group size increases, the 
collective costs of enforcing property rights rise just as the probability of detecting 
opportunism decreases.  Public-order institutions, by contrast, – such as modern courts, 
regulations, police and laws – regulate competition through the formal framework of 
institutions of the State (see North 1981, 1990). These institutions have the advantage of 
scale economies in enforcement, but this particular type of regulation is itself less 




entails efficiency loss as well as a diluted capacity to levy sanctions on opportunism.  
Historically, the role played by institutions in regulating competition and creating 
unity among economic actors has been important for growth and economic development 
in nation-states (Ogilvie and Carus 2014). Douglass North wrote, “the inability of 
societies to develop effective, low-cost enforcement of contracts is the most important 
source of both historical stagnation and underdevelopment” (North 1990, p.54). As was 
the case with Grief’s traders (cited above), private-order institutions arise in order to fill 
this political-organizational void. A recent tangible example of how private-order 
institutions organize and provide unity to the capitalist class at the local-level can be 
found in Whitt (1980). In a piece titled Can Capitalists Organize Themselves, Whitt 
suggested capitalists in San Francisco in the late 1960s and 1970s used a set of 
institutions (i.e., norms and sanctions and formal rules) to solve a collective action 
problem with respect to acting in their shared interest, namely, the financing of physical 
infrastructure and related projects. The case studies used by Whitt indicate that, 
particularly at the local level, capitalists used intraclass mechanisms to specify the way 
each capitalist would share the costs and benefits of proposed projects. There appears, 
according to Whitt’s analysis, to be a precise hierarchical ordering of lobbying effort, 
with capitalists spending in proportion to their expected benefit and rarely engaging in 
head-to-head competition with one another. Whitt suggested that capitalists can cooperate 
using “intraclass mechanisms, often eliminating the need for these issues (p.52)” to be 
resolved by an outside agent and that “concrete strategies are generated, often in 
personal, face-to-face groups within the business community” (Whitt 1980, p.57). 




problem among capitalists. This allowed individual capitalists to reap the benefits of 
cooperation while also institutionalizing their ability to sanction those who attempted to 
free-ride on the collective costs of infrastructural investment. 
Whitt’s research holds light to the endogenous nature of regulatory institutions 
and the origin of the State itself. Once institutionalized and its boundaries defined, the 
local club of capitalists begins to function as an exogenous enforcer of the rules of 
competition to individual businesspeople, acquiring a history and dynamic of its own. 
What happens at a national level might not be qualitatively different from the local level. 
Yet because face-to-face intraclass channels of interaction are less effective at the 
national level, capitalists face stronger incentives to defect from cooperation or try to 
capture the process by which rules are made and enforced. Indeed, the transaction-costs 
of mobilizing class interests and regulating competition under private-order institutions at 
the national level are prohibitive. This is why there are immense scale economies, 
suggested North, for a State with coercive power to act as a third-party enforcer to every 
contract (North 1990, p.58). Enforcing contracts and fostering unification at the national 
level can be made more efficient with a robust and autonomous third-party mechanism 
(c.f. Ayres and Braithwaite 1991). This in turn makes acting in one’s enlightened self-
interest the dominant business strategy, provided these institutions are impartial.  
 
2.3 The Origin of the State 
The origin of the State can be thought of as a means to unify actors within its 
boundaries in an effort to organize collective agency. Robert Carneiro defined the State 




and having a centralized government with the power to collect taxes, draft men for work 
or war, and decree and enforce laws” (Carneiro 1970, p.733). Carneiro suggested that the 
political organization of the State is due to two types of circumscription, scarce land 
circumscribed by natural boundaries and by social boundaries. He suggested that 
population pressure leads to intensified food production and the search for new land. This 
search for land leads increasingly to conflict, often driving away weaker villages and 
populations and augmenting the power of the victors. When fleeing is not possible, 
people are forced to abide by the rules and institutions of the conquerors. Carneiro 
therefore found the State to be predatory, writing that “[f]orce, and not enlightened self-
interest, is the mechanism by which political evolution has led, step by step, from 
autonomous villages to the state” (Carneiro 1970, p.734). Yet regulating this conflict is 
collectively costly to the ruling elite, and Carneiro does not explicitly incorporate these 
costs into his theoretical framework.  
Douglass North emphasized the predatory potential of the State in connection 
with the cost of the enforcement of rules, contracts, and collection of taxes. North 
described the State in general as “an organization with a comparative advantage in 
violence, extending over a geographic area whose boundaries are determined by its 
power to tax constituents” (North 1981, p.21). Taxes that are necessary for the 
maintenance of the State “are inversely related to the perceived legitimacy of the existing 
system” (North 1981, p.53).  North defined the predatory State as the type of organization 
that relies on its capacity for violence to ensure the enforcement of rules and collection of 
taxes. He also recognized the potential that “those who run the state will use that force in 




ruling group) will define rules and property rights in order to maximize their private 
benefits, particularly if constituents lack the capability to impose costs on the ruler for 
making illegitimate rules or setting the tax rate too high.  
By contrast, if constituents can in fact impose costs on the ruler, this predatory 
potential can be kept in check. The ruler will then choose property rights that coincide 
with his/her long term (enlightened) as opposed to short-term (narrow) self-interest. This 
contract theory is North’s second view of the State, according to which the State arises 
because of the initial gains to voluntary contracting between the ruler and constituents 
and between constituents themselves. The State enforces contracts that limit the actions 
of all constituents, and acts as a third-party in matters between citizens. A well-
functioning State that promotes the common good will use its power to coerce in an 
enlightened way, with the provision that those who rule have a commitment device 
engendered by constituent’s ability to impose costs. 
The link connecting the two theories of the State, according to North, is the 
distribution of violence potential, which delineates the contractual relationship between 
the ruler and constituent. In the contract theory of the State, there is a symmetric 
distribution of power between ruler and constituent groups, such that the State “becomes 
the field on which the battle for control of its decision-making power is fought” (North 
1981, p.22). The capacity of constituents to impose costs on the ruler will ensure the 
maximization of social income in addition to the ruler’s private income. In the predatory 
depiction of the State, on the other hand, there is an unequal distribution of power 
between the two groups, which ensures the ruler will focus on maximizing private at the 




The State’s political organization therefore fosters economic growth and 
economic development through its specification of property rights, which also codify its 
ability to tax constituents. According to North, economic growth can reach its full 
potential when the ruler’s maximization of private income overlaps with the 
maximization of social welfare. However, to the extent the ruler promotes its private 
interests at the expense of social welfare, the costs of maintaining existing property rights 
and tax collection will tend to rise. Internally, the ruling group faces a principal-agent 
problem with respect to those responsible for carrying out enforcement and tax 
collection. To solve this, the ruler will grant monopoly income rights to some of its 
agents in order to better align their interests with hers. Given the difficulty of any given 
set of monopoly rights perfectly aligning the two sets of interests, various private and 
public-order institutions arise to minimize enforcement costs and to “realize cooperative 
outcomes” (North 1990, p58). 
Greif, Milgrom, and Weingast (1994) find historical evidence that supports 
North’s depiction of the State. The authors suggest that the State often fails to use its 
power in an enlightened way, and privately beneficial economic outcomes required that 
the predatory potential of the State could be checked. Private agents therefore required a 
commitment device, constraining their actions to engender collectively beneficial 
outcomes. In particular, the authors suggested that merchant guilds (private-order 
institutions) fulfilled this function for private wealth holders vis-à-vis the State during the 
late medieval period (Greif et al. 1994). Because the trust of various long-distance 
merchants was an important underlying characteristic of prosperous trading areas, Greif 




trading centers to be a countervailing power, enhancing the ruler’s ability to commit and 
laying an important institutional foundation for the growing trade of that period” (Greif et 
al. 1994, p.746). In essence, private-order institutions emerged as a commitment device 
for rulers to refrain from (potentially) malicious actions in a repeated trading-game 
setting.  
 
2.4 Marxist Theory of the State 
The Marxist literature on the capitalist State also suggests that a gap will likely 
always exist between private interests (e.g., accumulation) and public welfare (e.g., 
health of labor power). There are two main strands of thought within this literature.
17
 The 
first suggests that the economically dominant class in society holds State power, and 
therefore its interests will be most prominent in the formation of economic and social 
policy and in the enforcement of rules and contracts. The State, according to this view, is 
a political instrument of coercion in the hands of the class that monopolizes the economic 
resources of society. Ralph Miliband suggested that there are five core institutions of the 
State apparatus through which dominant classes exert control. These include “the 
government, the administration, the military and the police, the judicial branch, sub-
central government and parliamentary assemblies – which make up “the state,” and 
whose interrelationship shapes the form of the state system” (Miliband 1969, p.50). The 
main implication of this “instrumental” view is that private interests and public welfare 
are not likely to align. One problem that arises from this view of the State concerns how 
the dominant faction within the capitalist class solves an internal collective action 
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problem with respect to which particular faction makes the rules and obtains the tax 
revenue. 
In the second strand of Marxist thought on the capitalist State, this internal 
collective action problem is less of an issue. Rather than placing the focus on a committee 
of capitalists making the rules, the structural relations and institutions that arise from the 
nature of capitalist production are emphasized. Nicos Poulantzas, for instance, suggested 
that institutions of the State arise like scaffolding from a particular mode of production 
set in historical time (Poulantzas 1973, p.15). Although class conflict takes place within 
the institutions of the State, the State is itself relatively autonomous from the competitive 
jockeying that takes place between economically dominant factions of capitalists.
18
 By 
translating autonomously overall class interests at the political level, the State ensures 
that competition will not become detrimental to capitalists’ long-term collective class 
interests. Poulantzas writes, 
What then is the role of the capitalist class state in this context? It can be 
stated as follows: it takes charge, as it were, of the bourgeoisie’s political 
interests and realizes the function of political hegemony which the 
bourgeoisie is unable to achieve. But in order to do this, the capitalist 
state assumes a relative autonomy with regard to the bourgeoisie. […] For 
this relative autonomy allows the state to intervene not only in order to 
arrange compromises vis-à-vis the dominated classes, which, in the long 
run, are useful for the actual economic interests of the dominant classes or 
fractions; but also (depending on the concrete conjuncture) to intervene 
against the long-term economic interests of one or other fraction of the 
dominant class: for such compromises and sacrifices are sometimes 
necessary for the realization of their political class interests (Poulantzas 
1973, p.284f, italics in original). 
 
Because the capitalist class is characterized by competition and therefore disunity, 
factional divisions need to be resolved in such a way that they do not jeopardize the long-
term process of capital accumulation. This is accomplished “through the relative 
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autonomy of the state, through a state structure which [sic] is capable of transcending the 
parochial, individualized interests of specific capitalists and capitalist class fractions” 
(Gold et al. 1975). Adam Przeworski explained this most clearly when he wrote that “the 
task of reproducing capitalism cannot be assumed by the bourgeoisie; it can be 
accomplished only by the state acting against objections of individual firms. To maintain 
capitalism the state must be independent from the influence of capitalists” (Przeworski 
1990). This view of the State rejects the notion that the State is an instrument wielded by 
the ruling class, at least directly. Instead, the primary function of the State is to lay the 
foundation for (but not specifically implement)
19
 the conditions that support profitable 
capital accumulation and the long-term maintenance of domination of the society by the 
capitalist class as a whole. 
To reconcile these competing conceptions of the State, Gold, Lo, and Wright 
suggested that the State “must be conceived both as a structure constrained by the logic 
of the society within which it functions and as an organization manipulated behind the 
scenes by the ruling class” (Gold et al. 1975, p.46). This means that during certain 
historical periods the State is more or less autonomous from factional competition than it 
is during others. Different institutions within the State may also function according to a 
separate logic, with one set of institutions responding to structural constraints while 
another set responding to instrumental manipulation. Similarly, instead of defining the 
State within two polar categories, David Harvey (1976) argued that the State could be 
defined by the minimal functions it must perform to sustain capitalism, irrespective of 
who is in control. He noted that the capitalist mode of production has direct requirements 
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of the State, indicating that “the equality and freedom of exchange must be preserved, 
property rights must be protected and contracts enforced, mobility preserved, the 
‘anarchistic’ and destructive aspects of competition must be regulated, and the conflicts 
of interest between fractions of capital must be arbitrated for the ‘common good’ of 
capital as a whole” (Harvey 1976, p. 84, italics added). 
In contrast to this view, Henry (2008) suggested that the State “emerges with class 
society as an instrument of oppression, not as a means of reconciling what are 
fundamentally irreconcilable class conflicts” (p.23, italics in original). Henry’s view, 
based on his reading of Marx and Engels, suggested that the State is a “socially 
determined arrangement [that] was constituted by the instruments of coercion, both 
physical and ideological, with which the dominant economic class coerced other social 
classes” (Henry 2008, p.13).  This analysis, however, is only partially correct for it 
ignores the State’s multifaceted character, which is highlighted well in the following two 
passages by Fredrick Engels.  
[I]n order that [...] classes with conflicting economic interests, might not 
consume themselves and society in sterile struggle, a power seemingly 
standing above society became necessary for the purpose of moderating 
the conflict, of keeping it within the bounds of ‘order’; and this power, 
arisen out of society, but placing itself above it, and increasingly 
alienating itself from it, is the state (Engels 1884, p.753).  
 
However, while the State arises from conflict it also comes to mediate it as suggested. 
The “economically dominant class,” which seeks to exploit other classes as suggested by 
Henry and others, also rules it.  
As the state arose from the need to hold class antagonisms in check, but as 
it arose, at the same time, in the midst of conflict of these classes, it is, as a 
rule, the state of the most powerful, economically dominant class which, 
through the medium of the state, becomes also the politically dominant 




oppressed class. [...] [T]he modern representative state is an instrument of 
exploitation of wage labour by capital.  By way of exception, however, 
periods occur in which the warring classes balance each other so nearly 
that the state power, as ostensible mediator, acquires, for the moment, a 
certain independence of both (Engels 1884, p.753, italics added). 
 
During exceptional circumstances, a balance of class power contributes to a 
relatively autonomous State capable of imposing mutually beneficial restrictions on the 
capitalist class. This better aligns their long-term interests, despite one faction rising to 
dominance. This idea is distinct from the two views of the State previously articulated, 
the first as a simple instrument of domination and the second as a superstructure arisen 
from a mode of production. Instead, the State’s power seen from this angle is as an 
“ostensible mediator” that regulates competition and can provide conditions for class 
unification. The word ostensible is used because the State must be “perceived” as an 
impartial mediator. 
There are, therefore, multiple views of the capitalist State. First, it is a power 
arisen from and towering above society as the structuralist notion of base-superstructure 
suggests. Second, it is an apparatus controlled by the dominant economic class to exploit 
and exclude others. Third, among capitalists it must be perceived as a mediator, “keeping 
[competition] within the bounds of ‘order’” (Engels op. cit.). The State is not only “an 
organization of the possessing class for its protection against the non-possessing class,” 
(Engels 1884, p.754) but also an organization of the possessing class for its protection 
against itself. 
Although distinct, there are parallels between North’s depiction of the State and 
that described within the Marxist literature, the latter focusing on the role of class as 




define property rights and contracts along with their enforcement and can engage in 
predatory rent extraction by doing so, lowering the potential for economic growth. How 
the constituency deals with this problem is determined by the distribution of power, and 
in turn, their capacity for collective action. The capacity to retaliate is what keeps the 
actions of the ruler in line with her long-term interests. Marx suggested that when 
working class power is high, the ability of the capitalist class to act in their enlightened 
self-interest is also made easier. When workers have the capacity to impose costs on the 
capitalist class, the latter’s capacity for collective action is increased as is their ability to 
act in their long-term class interest. 
The foregoing raises the intriguing question whether an alignment between 
private accumulation and public welfare could have evolved in the U.S. Was the “golden 
age of capitalism” one of these “exceptional” times where class conflict was balanced?  
Did the balance of class power allow economic regulation to support capitalists 
enlightened self-interest? If so, how, and why did it dissolve? Was the State relatively 


























When autonomous from economic classes and interest groups, the State has the 
potential to impose mutually binding, socially beneficial restrictions on the capitalist 
class through its regulatory institutions. These restrictions can enable each individual 
capitalist to pursue its enlightened as opposed to narrow self-interest, thus unifying the 
capitalist class around its collective interests. This chapter develops a descriptive 
narrative of the success and breakdown in the agency of the capitalist class and provides 
historical evidence through the lens of taxation. Predictions from an analytical model of 
regulation are consistent with this narrative. The model details the way regulation can 
function as a commitment device, which, at its most effective, increases the likelihood of 
successful cooperation. 
 
3.1 Club Theory 
Public goods historically have played an important yet theoretically problematic 
role in economic analysis. Adam Smith, writing in An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes 
of the Wealth of Nations (Smith 1967 [1776]), found the provision of public goods to be 
an essential task of government. Samuelson (1954, 1955) outlined the modern 





free rider problem involved in their production. The continuum of economic goods runs 
from private goods to purely public goods. Public goods – like a lighthouse or national 
defense – are goods that are nonexclusionary in use and nonrivalrous in consumption, 
often exhibiting high levels of market failure. Private goods by contrast are both 
excludable and rivalrous, characterized by a low degree of market failure. Between public 
and private lie a continuum of goods, which can be classified by their rivalry and 
excludability as displayed in Table 3.1. Shifts in technology or changes in population can 
alter the categorization of goods as to whether the excludability of the benefits they 
provide or their rivalry in consumption change. When public goods become rivalrous – as 
advances in hunting technology and population growth had conceivably turned public 
goods into common pool resources – competition for resources intensify, and those more 
powerful have both an incentive and the ability to exclude rivals from resources (c.f. 
Carneiro’s depiction of the origin of the State). This type of exclusion requires some 
political organization to enforce boundaries that clearly delineate insiders from outsiders. 
This is important because, as Ostrom (2000) elaborates, resource over-extraction cannot 
otherwise be prevented. Insiders enjoy nonrivalrous access to resources but face sanctions 
if they fail to refrain from its opportunistic overuse. In more general terms, a social group 
or a society solves a common pool resource problem it faces by organizing itself 
politically in such a way as to (i) exclude outsiders, (ii) define a set of 
 
Table 3.1. Categorization of goods based on rivalry and excludability 
 
Excludable Nonexcludable
Rivalry Private Goods Common Pool Resources




rules of conduct for insiders designed to prevent resource over-extraction, and (iii) 
impose sanctions on those who violate the rules. 
The exclusion of outsiders implies a nonrivalrous resource use (consumption) for 
the insiders, whose access is conditional on meeting a set of obligations defined by the 
terms of their group membership. Technically, the political organization thereby formed 
is a club, producing (or provisioning) club goods (which are excludable but nonrival) as 
opposed to public goods which are neither excludable nor rivalrous. Clubs are collective 
organizations that provide a good or service to its members and prevent outsiders (as well 
as opportunistic insiders) from free riding on the good or service through a set of rules of 
conduct. Sandler and Tschirhart define a club as “a voluntary group deriving mutual 
benefits from sharing one or more of the following: production costs, the members’ 
characteristics, or a good characterized by excludable benefits” (Sandler and Tschirhart 
1997). 
Although the literature on the economic theory of clubs developed in the 1960s 
beginning with research by Buchanan (1965), Sandler and Tschirhart (1980) find 
examples in the work of Arthur Pigou and Frank Knight.
20
 The three essential 
components of a club
21
 are (i) a club good (a continuous or discrete product or set of 
products), (ii) a marginal benefit in excess of the utility of nonmembership, and (iii) an 
exclusion mechanism or boundary that demarcates members from nonmembers and 
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 An early critique and extension of Buchanan’s original model can be found in Berglas (1976), which also 
was an indication of the technical direction the literature was moving during the 1980s. In particular, the 
heterogeneous membership conditions for efficiency and admission prices were incorporated into club 
theory by extending the concept of the core from microeconomic theory (Scotchmer and Wooders 1987). 
21
 Sandler and Tschirhart (1997) specify six overall components of a club: membership must be voluntary; 
sharing results in crowding; there exists some exclusivity aspect whereby nonmembers are excluded; the 
number of clubs is determined by partitioning which implies competition among clubs; the presence of an 





prevents crowding (or at least provides compensation at the margin for any crowding that 
occurs). Although the costs-per-member of club good provision fall as more members are 
allowed to join the club (and likewise rise as members exit), increased membership 
results in crowding, other things being equal. In order to compensate an existing member 
for the cost of increasing club size, a fixed fee (or per-use fee) is established. Clubs are 
particularly relevant when the benefit of an imperfect public good cannot be priced or 
assigned individually, or when there are substantial externalities associated with their 
provision (Cornes and Sandler 1986) that cannot otherwise be internalized. 
The technology of supply, listed in Table 3.2, describes the collective provision of 
club goods. Four types of supply technology are prominent in the literature (Sandler 
1992), and include summation, weakest-link, best shot, and weighted sum. Summation 
technology represents an aggregation of individual contributions, making its supply 
subject to the well-known prisoners’ dilemma. While still able to share club benefits, 
overall provision will tend toward zero since each individual has an incentive to free ride 
on the contributions of others. A collectively suboptimal provision of the good therefore 
results unless the club has the capacity to sanction those acting opportunistically. 
Weakest-link technology of supply suggests that the smallest contribution will determine 
the overall provision level for the group. Larger club members thus have an incentive to  
 
Table 3.2. Technology of Supply 





























increase the provision levels of smaller club members. This can be individually costly for 
the larger members, which therefore gives weaker members the capacity to impose costs 
and prevent the larger members from acting opportunistically. In best-shot technology of 
supply, provision is determined by the largest contribution only. Similar to summation 
technology of supply, this technology is also characterized by free riding on collective 
provision of the good. Weighted-sum technology of supply, similar to standard 
summation technology, includes the potential for differential impacts of contribution 
levels.  An example of weighted-sum technology of supply is oil spill clean-up efforts 
(Sandler 1992). Recent research by Sandler (2001) examined both the microeconomic 
and macroeconomic aspects of international public goods, which is the level at which 
these supply distinctions become most relevant. Clubs form for the purpose of addressing 
the collective provision of an imperfect public good in order to achieve a joint benefit. 
When the normal provision of the imperfect public good is suboptimal and characterized 
by free riding, clubs are particularly relevant as organizational boundaries (because of 
the exclusion mechanism). For an individual to voluntarily join the club and share the 
costs of provision, however, the club must provide a benefit in excess of individual costs. 
Much of the literature today extends Buchanan’s (1965) original model of within-group 
optimization, which was summarized and updated by Sandler and Tchirhardt (1980; 
1997). In what follows, I briefly summarize the depiction by Sandler and Tchirhardt 
(1980). The theoretical predictions obtained can help inform the remainder of the 
discussion on the cohesiveness and breakdown of the club.  
Suppose group members are homogeneous and indexed i   (i,...,n), choosing 
levels of one private good, y, and a set of imperfect public goods X. The i
th




whether to join the club, that is, decides whether to subscribe to the set of goods 
available. Both y and X exhibit constant returns to scale in production.  Let y be the 
numeraire. The set of members, s, maximize utility subject to a production function C. 
The i
th
 individual’s problem is to 
 
















   i. ix X  is the i
th
 members consumption of the 
(impurely) public good. Its equivalence with total provision, X, implies that each 




 member’s consumption of the private good.  iU  is increasing in x, y, and s when 
s is small relative to total capacity, but decreasing when s is large relative to total 




















 for small 






 for large levels of s. These latter two assumptions imply there is 
a tipping point beyond which an increase in-group size no longer increases utility at the 
margin. This means the credibility of boundaries is a relevant (binding) consideration 






 implies that costs fall as 
membership increases (as more members share collective costs). Assuming that both 
( , , )i iU y X s  and ( , , )
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The first-order conditions are 
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By rearranging terms, the provision (equation 7) and membership (equation 8) conditions 
emerge. 
 





                                     (8) 
 
 
which are equivalent to 
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(1,..., )i ixy xyMRS MRT i s                                  (9) 
 
    (1,..., )i isy syMRS MRT i s            (10) 
 
The provision condition (equations 7 and 9) implies that individuals set the marginal rate 
of substitution between goods x and y with the marginal rate of transformation between 
the two goods. The membership condition (equations 8 and 10) states that the i
th
 
individual equates the marginal rate of substitution in group size, s, and private good, y, 
with the marginal rate of transformation between the two goods. This represents the 
marginal cost of an additional member. According to Sandler and Tschirhardt, “[i]f, at the 
margin, the club is breaking even in providing the public good, the sum of the members’ 
marginal costs must equal the club’s marginal cost of provision” which is “the usual 
Samuelson provision condition for public goods” (Sandler and Tschirhardt 1980, p.1484). 
Buchanan’s original model predicted that the incentives for defecting from the club 
require only that members weigh the marginal cost of defecting against its marginal 
benefit, which in turn, have been shown to depend on whether the relevant boundaries are 
credible.  
 
3.2 The State as a Club 
A club can be thought of as a village collective (Lindberg 2009), a professional 
group or guild (Greif et al. 1994), exercise, health, and swimming facility (Mendoza 
2012), a business or social organization (Whitt 1980), or a coalition of countries seeking 




goods it provisions would more accurately be called club goods, the State can itself be 
thought as a club (Erturk 2012). For instance, national defense, the quintessential 
textbook example of a public good, is technically speaking a club good. By definition, it 
entails protection of insiders from potentially belligerent outsiders. While nonrivalrous 
for any group member we call a citizen, it is exclusionary for everyone else. Erturk 
(2012) suggested that the same holds for many other social benefits and services 
citizenship entails one access to, including access to domestic labor power. The 
effectiveness of the State as a club depends also on its ability to set forth and enforce a set 
of rules of conduct (boundaries) that impose welfare enhancing and mutually binding 
restrictions on its internal members. Club boundaries organize member’s interests at the 
political level. They also apportion the benefit and cost of investing in the club, sanction 
opportunistic defection, and exclude outsiders. Boundaries are essential for any club 
because they allow “participants to know who is in and who is out of a defined set of 
relationships and thus with whom to cooperate” (Ostrom 2000, p.149). When effective, 
the boundary itself is rarely challenged; instead, it serves as a commitment device 
enabling club members to refrain from opportunistic defection because they know that 
those who do not will face sanction.  
The “golden age” of capitalism in the United States can be seen as an era when 
the club worked relatively well, mainly because regulation was taken for granted rather 
than challenged by the capitalist class (Chang 1997; CED 1971). Erturk (2012) suggested 
that by regulating access during the golden age, the State could husband and protect 
common pool resources by transforming them into club goods for the benefit of the 




regulation, large and small-scale mobilization of class interests was accomplished during 
the golden age, as investment in the commons was made profitable to members of the 
club (Erturk 2012).  This task is more difficult to carry out at the global level, however, 
where political and economic boundaries are permeable. William Tabb (2004) attempted 
to address this complication by viewing global governance institutions as a series of 
clubs. Economic governance, suggested Tabb, consists of mechanisms for the 
coordination of common interests, and “[p]roviding such a regulatory framework and 
corresponding enforcement mechanisms are clubs which can be understood as providing 
public goods that reconfigure sovereignty” (Tabb 2004, p.143). 
 
3.3 Historical Perspective 
Although a variety of factors combined to determine cohesiveness of economic 
classes, some took a more prominent role than others. In the U.S., the State’s capacity to 
unify class interests began to fragment when national and regulatory boundaries were 
made porous with increased capital mobility during the late 1970s (Erturk 2012; Ghai 
1994). This in turn led to a host of secondary institutional effects stemming from the 
institutional arbitrage (and other rule changing) it made possible.
22
 
The reasoning can be described as a simple story of supply and demand. During 
the 1970s, a rise in capital mobility increased demand for the relaxation of institutional 
rules and constraints deemed harmful to profits. This “deregulation” was not symmetric 
across the capitalist class, however, leading to increased institutional arbitrage (Kogut 
1983; Witt and Lewen 2007) as each individual capitalist sought the lowest incidence of 
regulation and the lowest incidence of taxation. New institutions and rules of the game 
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were enacted in response to this increased demand for new rules,
23
 allowing some 
capitalists (especially in finance) to gain a competitive advantage relative to others. 
Minimizing their tax incidence also precipitated increased tax evasion (Kelly 2004; 
Vernon 1998, Caves 2007; Gordon and Hines 2002). As capitalists began to evade taxes 
during the 1980s, the brunt of collective costs fell disproportionally on the remaining 
“cooperators.” In other words, those playing by the rules ended up paying more than their 
fair share of the costs of supporting the commons and domestic capital accumulation.  
Impelled from a widely held perception of bloat and rigidity within the 
government bureaucracy, significant legislative efforts in the late 1970s sought to reform 
the structure and operation of State institutions. The Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 
(CSRA) was the “most comprehensive reform of the federal civil service since the 
Pendleton Act” of 1883 (Ingraham and Ban 1984, p.1; see also Ingraham and Colby 
1982). Among other provisions, the centerpiece of the CSRA was the creation of the 
Senior Executive Service (SES), designed to produce “an elite cadre of more flexible, 
more mobile managers” (Ingraham 1984, p.18). These new managers were to be 
governed by individual performance contracts that reduced job security in exchange for 
the opportunity to compete for a fixed pool of bonus money and similar monetary 
incentives.
24
 Through their broad efforts to restore managerial authority and enhance 
bureaucratic efficiency and productivity – the justification for which was grounded in the 
scientific management literature – members of the capitalist class exerted substantial 
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 Two examples of “new rules” are the Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 
1980 and the Garn-St. Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982, key pieces of legislation in the 
deregulation of the financial sector. 
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 Indeed, the text of the legislation called for a compensation package “measured on the basis of individual 
and organizational performance (including such factors as improvements in efficiency, productivity, quality 
of work or service, cost efficiency, and timeliness” (quoted in Ingraham and Ban 1984, p.325, with further 




influence during the drafting phase of the CSRA (see, for example, CED 1978).  
In effect, the CSRA was an institutionalized restructuring of the government 
bureaucracy toward a private sector, market-dictated approach to Statecraft. This 
approach implicitly prioritized methods of business administration over those of public 
administration (Thayer 1984).  Downplayed as a result were the “traditional public 
personnel values of equity and procedural uniformity” (Ingraham and Ban 1984, p.2). 
Despite its passage in the fall of 1978, some of the most important provisions of the 
CSRA (such as, for example, creation of the SES) were not implemented until May of 
1979. In retrospect, the timing of CSRA implementation turned out to be inopportune. 
With the election of the Regan administration (and its deregulatory policy agenda), 
formerly stable State institutions – those once autonomous from partisan political and 
economic influence – were now infused with instability. Market-defined performance 
criteria effectively politicized government managers, which, in conjunction with rapid yet 
uncoordinated deregulation, created the perfect conditions for unstable institutions and an 
increased perception of agency capture.  
By politicizing the bureaucracy in order to bring about tighter political control 
over top managers (Clark 1978; Sundquist 1980; c.f. Huber and Shipan 2002), the Act 
had the unintended consequence of eroding long held confidence in the neutrality of 
administrators and agencies with respect to political and private economic interests. This 
erosion occurred along two lines. First, the politicization of managers effectively 
dissolved the bureaucracy’s capacity to function as a commitment device for members of 
Congress (through procedural means). It was recognized shortly after the passage of the 




CSRA, problems began to emerge that demonstrated a rather dramatic tip toward politics 
at the clear expense of neutrality” (Ingraham and Colby 1982, p.306). Second, by making 
managers more alert to the political and economic implications of their decisions, the 
foundation upon which regulatory agency autonomy rested was undermined, opening the 
door to increased perception of capture. 
A related instance of the new economic rules of the game was the transition in 
corporate legal structure that took place at the beginning of the 1980s.  Richard Green 
writes that this transition shifted the risks of profit seeking from owners to shareholders, 
noting that  
A significant trigger point for rampant, irresponsible use of [collateralized 
financial] devices came in the early 1980s when Wall Street investment 
banks changed their governance structures from private partnerships, the 
dominant form to that point, to publicly traded corporations (Green 2012, 
p.114). 
 
Firms once bound by stringent rules regarding risk (especially in finance), now found 
themselves able to socialize potential losses, while firms still bound by stringent rules 
could either demand deregulation of their niche of the economy or shift focus to more 
profitable sectors. Research by Green also describes the institutional and economic 
consequences engendered by the period of rapid deregulation in the late 1970s and early 
1980s, particularly in the financial sector. Green notes that the new governance structure 
that emerged during this period “propelled momentous changes in institutional behavior 
because it dispersed liability for losses to shareholders, and freed management to pursue 
profits to the exclusion of sound governance” (Green 2014, p.30). These momentous 
changes emerged from the demand by capitalists for a relaxation of institutional rules and 




supply of these new rules by legislators. 
The political struggle that results from this supply and demand for new rules of 
the game (and concomitant institutional arbitrage), while often termed deregulation, is 
more aptly called re-regulation (Block and Somers 2014). Re-regulation should be kept 
conceptually distinct from mere increases or decreases in overall regulation. Piecemeal 
re-regulation, highly specific in each industry, makes use of targeted legislation (c.f. 
McCubbins et al. 1987). It shifts the incidence of regulation or its cost onto the commons 
or onto other capitalists. Naturally, intensified political conflict accompanies re-
regulation because the burden of maintaining the commons shifts from one faction to the 
next, creating a race to the bottom in regulatory standards and intensity.  
Downward harmonization in the intensity of regulation (see Davies and 
Vadlamannati 2013; Olney 2013) meant that different factions of capitalists no longer 
played by the same set of rules, depriving regulation of its credibility with respect to 
disciplining opportunistic behavior (Bowles and Wagman 1997; Ghai 1994). As 
regulation began to fragment, it caused the club to unravel as it was unable to sanction 
those capitalists who chose to engage in opportunistic defection. Once cost shifting and 
opportunistic defection became potential means of increasing profitability, free riding 
became emblematic of this new era.
25
  
The payoff to re-regulation can only be short-lived, however.  This can be seen in 
the schematic representation of Table 3.3. When effective, regulation keeps the 
interaction at the “both cooperate” payoff by making the “short-term windfall payoff” out 
of reach or unprofitable, essentially by imposing a toll on opportunism. Robust and  
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Table 3.3. Payoff matrix for cooperation and opportunism 
 
 
credible regulation is represented by arrow “A.” However, the ineffectiveness of 
regulation caused by re-regulation meant that it was no longer a credible deterrent. This 
also meant that opportunistic re-regulation became the “best” strategy because it secured, 
albeit temporarily, short-term windfall profits, or avoided others’ realizing it at one’s 
expense. As attempts were made to re-regulate in one’s own favor, the belief that 
regulation was a sanction against overall opportunism eventually began to ring hollow, 
incentivizing further re-regulation. Thus, the increasing attraction of the profit 
opportunity associated with re-regulation will move the interaction to the “both defect” 
payoff along arrow “B.” That is to say, the short-term windfall payoff cannot persist in 
subsequent rounds as opportunism abounds. Developed more rigorously below, the 
fundamental idea is that in the short-run re-regulation can be profitable, while in the long 
run it ends up making collective action much more problematic. 
One concrete expression of the political struggle of re-regulation is downward 
harmonization in taxation.
26
 Taxes, which are one form that investment in the club can 
take, were high during the golden age but politically unchallenged as long as they could 
not be skirted by those inside the club. For nearly half a century, from 1932 to 1980, the 
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top federal marginal income tax rate in the United States averaged 81 percent (Piketty 
2014). The tax revenue financed robust social expenditures beneficial both to capitalists 
and workers. Total U.S. government expenditures increased steadily as a percentage of 
GDP from around 20 percent in 1950 to a local peak of around 35 percent in 1982 (St. 
Louis Federal Reserve 2014).
27
 In 2013, by contrast, the top federal marginal income tax 
rate stood at just under 40 percent for high earners (Tax Foundation 2015). Other 
measures of taxation show a similar tendency toward decline after 1980 (OECD 2015). 
For instance, taxes on corporate profits as a percentage of gross domestic product in the 
U.S. averaged 3.26 percent from 1965 to 1979, which declined to an average of 2.3 
percent from 1980 to 2012. In addition, taxes on property (including inheritance and 
financial property) averaged 3.52 percent of GDP in the U.S. prior to 1980, and just 2.91 
after. 
Capital mobility, re-regulation, and downward harmonization in taxation are not 
unrelated phenomena. The undermining of regulatory and other borders around 1980 
made taxes and the social welfare they supported increasingly irrelevant for corporate 
profit, as well as increasingly costly in relative terms for those still committed to 
cooperation. It was thus not surprising that taxes came to be viewed as a burden requiring 
deft accounting practices and political savvy; Marx foresaw such an interaction between 
capitalists as becoming “a question of strength and cunning” (Marx 1991, p.362). 
Take tax havens, for example, which consist of banking locations in countries with 
opaque rules with respect to financial reporting for tax collection purposes. Banking 
institutions in several worldwide locations saw nonresident deposits grow rapidly (as a 
percentage of gross world product) during the mid-1980s, and again after 2005.  
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Unfortunately, proper data are not available prior to 1984 for many countries typically 
considered tax havens. However, the numbers that are available for the growth in use of 
tax havens after 1980 can be interpreted as a rise in the prevalence of opportunism. Data 
for Switzerland, for instance, available since 1977, suggest that growth in deposits was 
robust during the 1980s.  Switzerland saw a 259 percent growth in nonresident deposits 
as a percentage of world GDP from 1977 (fourth quarter) to 1987 (fourth quarter), while 
other “island” tax havens saw a 227 percent growth over a comparable period of time 
(1983 q4 to 1993 q4). Figures 3.1 and 3.2 display these trends through time. These data 
are consistent with different measures of tax havens calculated by Dumenil and Levy 
(2011, p.120). Tax evasion is one tangible illustration of the breakdown in capitalist class 
unity represented in the schematic model (in Table 3.3). Tax evasion severed the ability 
of the State to sanction further defection from the club, which in turn accentuated the 
free-rider problem, further incentivizing opportunism (tax avoidance). The result of this 
tax avoidance was mounting unmet collective costs as free riding intensified with each 
capitalist struggling to reduce their share of the costs and tax burden. 
For an analysis of the related phenomenon of tax inversions, which, not 
coincidentally, first appeared in 1983, see Kelly (2004). Today, even the threat of a 
corporate tax inversion brings forth calls by public officials for lowering the corporate tax 
rate to zero (see Marples and Gravelle 2014). 
The institutional arbitrage induced by re-regulation that began around 1980 
eventually undermined the autonomy of the State itself. Clearly, once regulatory 
institutions lose their relative autonomy from the very economic interests they are 





Figure 3.1. Rise of Tax Havens: Switzerland 
Data source: Author calculation. BIS (2015) data for Switzerland. World GDP calculated 







Figure 3.2. Rise of Tax Havens: Island Tax Havens 
Data source: Author calculation.  BIS (2015) data includes Cayman Islands, Singapore, 
Hong Kong, Bahamas, and Netherland Antilles. World GDP calculated using OECD 






































































































































































































































































































mutually binding restrictions on opportunism. This is why the State must be relatively 
autonomous from capitalists; the pursuit of enlightened self-interest requires that 
economic actors do not privately benefit by co-opting the regulation that was once 
intended to bring about collective gain. Ultimately, as the club solution to 
macroeconomic cooperation unraveled, collective action became a strictly dominated 
strategic choice.  
 
3.4 Analytic Model 
At an individual level the demand for re-regulation, although profitable in the 
short run for a select few, makes collective action more difficult. Precisely when it is 
working best, competition exacerbates this collective action problem by creating, in 
game-theoretic terms, an n-person prisoners’ dilemma (Hardin 1982). Successful 
regulation – in which the State imposes uniform and mutually binding regulatory 
restrictions that jointly benefit most, if not all, in an economy – can diminish this 
collective action problem by increasing the payoff to cooperation relative to defection. 
The following model sheds light on exactly why regulation succeeds in engendering 




Suppose there is a finite population of players, N   (1, ... , n), with n assumed to 
be even for n > 2. There is a random and anonymous (i.e., before the game) pairing of 
two players according to the matching function m(ξ): N → N. Players use one of two 
strategies when they meet that are initially unknown to the other player, tit-for-tat or 
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 The model is extended in the following ways. A more detailed preamble to the model better outlines the 
structure of the game; theta is incorporated as a tax on the payoff to defection; the manner by which the 




universal defect. Payoffs to these strategies are symmetric and are consistent with the 
usual prisoners’ dilemma structure, σ > γ > χ > ω such that 2γ > σ + ω. Sigma is the 
opportunism payoff, gamma the cooperate payoff, chi is the defect payoff, and omega the 
sucker’s payoff.  
It has been suggested in the foregoing that regulation is endogenous and based on 
class conflict. θ   [0,1] is the intensity of this regulation, coming into play when one 
player using a cooperate strategy is paired with another using a defect strategy. The way 
regulation works is by decreasing the payoff to opportunistic behavior (the windfall 
payoff, σ) relative to the cooperate payoff (γ). Regulation intensity is strictly increasing 
and continuous on [0,1]. θ = 0 represents strictly porous regulation (low intensity) that 
does not reduce the value of opportunism, while θ = 1 is high regulation intensity that 
reduces to zero the current-round value of opportunism (complete or strict regulation with 
respect to σ). Incorporated in theta is the probability of detection of opportunism by the 
regulatory institutions. Rounds terminate with probability ρ, making the expected number 
of rounds 1/ρ. This information can be organized as in the payoff matrix of Table 3.4.  
Assume that fraction ξ of the population play a strategy of tit-for-tat (played by 
“Column” in the payoff matrix) and fraction (1-ξ) of the population play a pure defect 
strategy (played by “Row” in the payoff matrix) over a short enough time horizon 
 














to ignore the discounting of future payoffs.
29
 Expected payoffs as a function of ξ for the 
tit-for-tat strategy (πT) and defect strategy (πD) can be described by equations (11) and 
(12). 
 
πT (ξ) = (ξ)γ/ρ + (1-ξ)[ω+(1-ρ)χ/ρ]        (11) 
 
πD (ξ) = (ξ)[σ(1-θ)+(1-ρ)χ/ρ] + (1-ξ)χ/ρ       (12) 
 
These expected payoffs are positive linear functions of ξ. By setting equations (11) and 
(12) equal to one another and solving for ξ, the equilibrium fraction, ξ*, of those playing 
each strategy type (tit-for-tat or defect) can be determined.  This equilibrium boundary 
can be represented by equation (13). 
 
                 (13)  
 
ξ* is an internal equilibrium (i.e., an element of  [0,1]) if ρ is less than 1/2, and if the 
denominator is positive. ξ* is an unstable equilibrium, since small deviations above or 
below equilibrium do not reconverge. This can be seen clearly in Figure 3.3. To see why 
it is unstable, notice that to the right of ξ*, the cooperate payoff relative to the defect 
payoff is increasing. This leads over time to a rising fraction of the population seeking to 
cooperate, meaning more and more players using tit-for-tat strategies will meet. To the 
left of ξ*, the defect payoff relative to the cooperate payoff is increasing. This leads over 
time to a decreasing fraction of the population willing to cooperate as more and more  
                                                 
29

















Figure 3.3. Incremental effect of regulation θ on the equilibrium boundary ξ. 
 
players using defect strategies meet. Because ξ* is an unstable equilibrium, it represents 
the boundary for the respective basins of attraction for stable equilibria ξ=0 (no 
cooperators) and ξ=1 (all cooperators). The partial derivative of equation (13) withrespect 
to theta shows the impact of regulation on this boundary. The marginal effect of 
increased regulation intensity θ on the boundary between strategies can be seen in 
equation (14). 
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equilibrium to the left, decreasing the basin of attraction for the defect strategy (i.e., the 
space to the left of ξ*) while increasing the basin of attraction for the tit-for-tat strategy 
(i.e., the space to the right of ξ*). Regulation intensity of 0 through 1 is shown on the 
right-hand vertical axis of Figure 3.3. To the right of ξ* on the horizontal axis is the 
percentage of the population playing tit-for-tat strategy because its relative payoff is 
higher. To the left of ξ* is the percentage of players using the universal defect strategy 
because its relative payoff is higher. When regulation intensity has no effect on 
opportunism (θ=0), payoffs are indicated by the upward sloping solid lines. Holding 
constant the expected payoff to the tit-for-tat strategy (πT(ξ)) – because regulation does 
not influence its expected payoff – an increase in regulation intensity from 0 to 1 rotates 
downward the expected payoff for defection (πD(ξ)), shifting the boundary leftward from 
ξ* eventually to ξ†. An increase in theta means that the expected cost of future retaliation 
for a defector increases, shown through a rotation downward of its expected payoff 
function, shifting the unstable equilibrium to the left. The ultimate effect is an increase in 
the probability of game-wide cooperation because of a rise in the likelihood of meeting 
another player who plays strategy tit-for-tat.  
 
3.5 Calibration 
Values of ξ can be calibrated by assuming plausible values for the payoffs to 
satisfy the necessary prisoners’ dilemma inequalities. Suppose there is a 25 percent 
chance rounds are terminated (ρ=.25), and that the vector (σ > γ > χ > ω) = (8  > 6> 4 > 2) 
describes the respective payoffs.
30
 Given these assumed values, expected payoffs to each 
strategy type are listed on the vertical axes of Figure 3.4. As regulation intensity  
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Figure 3.4. Predicted values of the cooperation boundary ξ with assumed payoff values. 
 
increases, the expected value of defection falls, which increases the space to the right of 
ξ*. A value of θ = .5 means that regulation intensity reduces the value of opportunism by 
50 percent, which leads to an expected value for the defect payoff equal to the mutual 
defect payoff at 16. At θ = .5, roughly 80 percent of the population will be willing to 
cooperate, while 20 percent will chose the defect strategy. At θ = .75, the expected value 
of the opportunism payoff falls to a level equivalent with the sucker’s payoff at 14. When 
θ = 1, the expected value of the opportunism payoff falls below the sucker’s payoff to a 
value of 12. At this intensity of regulation, the level of cooperators will be approximately 
86 percent and the level of defectors will comprise approximately 14 percent of the game 
population.  
Keeping with these assumed values, Figure 3.5 displays the incremental effect of 






Figure 3.5. Effect of regulation on the percentage of cooperators. 
 
strictly increasing in regulation intensity, as shown with the assumed values. Notice that 
involves informal as well as formal institutions. In this model regulation serves as a 
commitment device, its intensity determining the penalty for deviating from cooperation. 
The model suggests that through increasing the intensity of regulation the State has the 
potential to increase the number of cooperators by increasing the expected cost for a 
defector. Yet this only occurs when the State’s regulatory apparatus is autonomous 
enough to shore-up effectively any regulatory boundaries that are porous. As the 
percentage of cooperators increases, so too does the probability of reaching the stable 
equilibrium where everyone cooperates as opposed to reaching the stable equilibrium 
where no one cooperates.  ξ† can thus be interpreted as the cooperation boundary 
engendered by regulation during the golden age. By contrast, a decrease in the intensity 
of regulation makes more numerous those playing the defect strategy by increasing its 



































that occurred around 1980 can be described analytically as a weakening of its intensity. 
With regulation made porous, the cooperation boundary shifted to the right, increasing 
the percentage of players using the defect strategy as its relative payoff increased.  
Predictions of the model indicate that re-regulation will be profitable in the short 
run by increasing the return to opportunism (σ) for a select few, but detrimental to 
collective action in the long run by eroding confidence in the cooperation of others, 
which can thus dissolve quickly once regulatory boundaries become porous. This 















LITERATURE ON REGULATION AND STATE CAPTURE 
 
 
Lobbying expenditures in the United States have been on the rise since the late 
1970s (Kaiser 2010), which is not surprising given its rapidly increasing rate of return 
(Alexander et al. 2009; Weissman and Donohue 2009). The adverse side effects of the 
malleable and impartial regulation excessive lobbying gives rise to have only lately 
begun to surface. These include systemic risk in financial markets (Igan et al. 2011) and 
perverse incentives (Skaife et al. 2013).  
Yet a solution to these costs today remains absent. This is because the literature 
on economic regulation, while correctly identifying these costs, has remained 
theoretically fragmented, making policy recommendations at best incomplete. This 
chapter bridges the theoretical discussion with the empirical findings reported in Chapter 
5 by providing a critical review of this literature. It contrasts the literature on regulation 
that characterizes the dysfunction of State institutions as a problem of too much 











The central idea behind economic regulation is to bridge the gap between private 
profit and public welfare. This concept was uncontroversial to an enlightened 
representative of the capitalist class during the golden age (see, for example, CED 1971, 
p.28-29). Successful economic regulation of markets can take many different forms. The 
earliest work on regulation was done by Arthur Pigou (1924), who argued that taxation 
should be used to equalize the marginal benefit of a private endeavor with its marginal 
social cost. Coase (1960) approached the problem from a different perspective, arguing 
that if the costs of transacting (or bargaining) are zero, tax or regulatory interventions are 
unnecessary as individuals will converge on the price or set of contracts that correct a 
market externality. Yet to Coase, an economy consisting of zero transaction costs is 
uncommon. He therefore also understood the important role government might play when 
transaction costs are positive. Coase writes  
Of course it does not imply, when transaction costs are positive, that 
government actions (such as government operation, regulation, or 
taxation, including subsidies) could not produce a better result than relying 
on negotiations between individuals in the market. Whether this would be 
so could be discovered not by studying imaginary governments but what 
real governments actually do. My conclusion: let us study the world of 
positive transaction costs (Coase 1992, p.717). 
 
 Douglass North built on Coase’s notion of positive transaction costs in his 
influential research on the State and institutions (North 1981; 1990). Institutions, 
suggested North, “are the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction” 
(North 1990, p.3). His research argued that institutions provide markets with the “rules of 
the game” for competition and cooperation, aligning private interests with social welfare 




– as in governmental or financial institutions – or they can be private-order – as in 
networks, customs, or routines. According to North, institutions are the referees of 
markets that make the rules of the game uniform and binding to all players.
31
 In a modern 
capitalist economy, public-order institutions are the main third-party mechanism for 
lowering the transaction costs of organizing collective economic activity in markets. An 
intriguing question is whether this third-party is neutral with respect to the participants. 
Will participants always trust that governmental institutions will act impartially, or will 
they attempt to steer these institutions in self-serving ways? Clearly, it is essential that the 
correct mix of neutral enforcement, formal regulation, and informal constraints become 
important components of all public-order institutions (c.f. North 1990, p.58). 
 It has been suggested that economic regulation can take two basic forms as to 
whether it is narrow or broad (Dal Bo 2006). The narrow view is limited to the 
government regulation of natural monopolies in which balancing public and private 
interests means permitting economies of scale in production while regulating output 
prices and limiting negative externalities such as environmental pollution. The broad 
view of economic regulation encompasses any type of government intervention in the 
economy – in transportation, manufacturing, finance, or other industries – to provide the 
“rules of the game” (i.e., boundaries) for product and factor markets. 
 It is the regulatory institutions in this second, broader sense that become 
dysfunctional if private interests co-opt economic regulation at the expense of public 
welfare. This is what the literature describes as regulatory capture, but is more accurately 
labeled opportunistic re-regulation, symptomatic of a breakdown in the unity of the 
capitalist class. Carpenter and Moss (2013) define regulatory capture as “the result or 
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process by which regulation, in law or application, is consistently or repeatedly directed 
away from the public interest and toward the interests of the regulated industry, by the 
intent and action of the industry itself” (p.13).  
It is within this literature that economists address some of the more concrete 
topics resulting from dysfunctional institutions such as systemic risk in the financial 
system and welfare loss in the case of monopoly. Two prominent studies of regulatory 
capture in the literature include Stigler’s (1971) research on the trucking industry in the 
1930s and Huntington’s (1952) study of the Interstate Commerce Commission and its 
regulation of railroads. In both instances, the regulatory apparatus had become captured 
and incapable of regulating their target industry in support of the public interest. There 
have been several critiques of Stigler’s econometric approach (see Carpenter and Moss 
2013), but the intuitive idea behind it has been influential among economists, ultimately 
laying the foundation for the way many economists think about capture today.  
The literature on regulatory capture can be separated into two strands of thought. 
For the Chicago school, the problem of capture stems from an equilibrium between the 
supply and demand for regulation and political tradeoffs (Stigler 1971; Peltzman 1976; 
Laffont and Tirole 1991). Basing regulation on supply and demand rather than on social 
(collective) costs, political intervention in the economy is described by the Chicago 
school as inefficient because resources could potentially be reallocated for economic gain. 
For the Virginia school, on the other hand, regulation of the economy itself stimulates 
rent seeking as capitalists search for opportunities to out-bid one another for favorable 
regulation (Buchanan and Tullock 1962; Tullock 1967; Krueger 1974). This makes 




salient categories of regulatory capture and rent seeking in the United States can help 
illustrate the divergence between private profit and public welfare (i.e., the failure of 
regulation). 
The first category deals with the formation of trade policy in the United States.
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Hoffman (2005) developed a general model of the formation of trade policy in which 
industry protection results from the ability of the government and firms (or interest 
groups) to solve a commitment problem. The baseline of Hoffman’s model is free trade, 
which can be thought of as arising because of the difficulty the government faces in 
committing to a particular vector of trade policy in conjunction with the difficulty a 
capitalist faces in committing to a schedule of campaign contributions. This free-trade 
equilibrium revolves around the time-inconsistent nature of setting the trade policy versus 
receiving the campaign contributions. The external effect of this commitment problem is 
actually positive for society, suggests Hoffman, writing, “[t]he difficulty the government 
and interest groups have in committing to actions is bad for them, but good for society” 
(Hoffman 2005, p.186). However, a substantially different conclusion follows when the 
interaction is conceptualized as a game between two capitalists (or factions thereof). 
When analyzed in this way, capitalists will maximize instead of minimize the amount 
spent on lobbying because they expect others to do so as well. They essentially become 
locked in a very similar commitment problem, only now, it is the inability to solve it that 
is costly. Indeed, the least-costly course of action for individual capitalists – in which 
they maximize lobbying expenditures because others will as well – now becomes bad for 
them and for the society. Thus, in contrast to Hoffman’s model, competition in 
conjunction with a commitment problem creates a negative externality. Clearly, in this 
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case, it is the task of impartial regulation to make profit invariant to the lobbying 
expenditures of capitalists. 
The broader literature on rent seeking is simply a more general version of 
Hoffman’s depiction of trade policy. The literature suggests that regulation of trade is 
ineffective at bridging the gap between private profits and public welfare because it 
creates rents and the attempt to capture them involves a wasteful use of resources (Posner 
1975). Within this literature, why is regulation is so ineffective? Tullock (1967) argued 
that standard estimates of the welfare costs of tariffs are often underestimated because 
they fail to account for the resources spent in rent seeking, and that tariffs will stimulate 
additional welfare loss when firms attempt to divert income using the impartial political 
process. Known as the “Tullock” version of the all-pay auction (Wenders 1987; Ellingsen 
1991; Baye et al. 1996), rent-seeking firms will bid-up the resources spent in the lobbying 
process – occasionally in excess of the actual expected rent received – because they know 
others will too. Krueger (1974) also made connections between the rent-seeking literature 
and trade policy, writing, “competitive rent seeking for import licenses entails a welfare 
cost in addition to the welfare cost that would be incurred if the same level of imports 
were achieved through tariffs” (Krueger 1974, p.295).33 In the context of impartial 
regulatory institutions, some economic actors will gain merely by exercising political 
power. It is therefore not surprising that this literature concludes there is too much 
government regulation of the economy.  
Trade policy formation can also be thought of as an interaction between the 
supplier of a vector of trade policy (i.e., government) and those who demand such 
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 Krueger’s thesis has found empirical support recently in the case of imported tuna into the United States; 




protection (i.e., capitalists). The two most well known among this class of models are the 
“protection for sale” model (Grossman and Helpman 1994; Grossman and Helpman 
1996) and the “black-hole tariffs” model (Magee et al. 1989).34 In the protection for sale 
model, an incumbent politician maximizes a welfare function over political campaign 
contributions – that is, the private interests of both the politician and those contributing – 
and over voter welfare and the public interest. These campaign contributions generate 
protective tariffs, nontariff barriers, and other artificial means to inflate capitalist profits 




In an empirical assessment of the protection for sale model, Eicher and Osang 
conclude that “[t]he broad picture that emerges about the U.S. pattern of protection is that 
it is influenced by lobbying spending and lobbying competition, and that, hence, 
protection is ‘sold’” (Eicher and Osang 2002, p. 150). The protection for sale model has 
seen several other empirical tests in the literature (Goldberg and Maggi 1999; Gawande 
and Bandyopadhyay 2000), which also support its theoretical predictions. Baldwin and 
Magee (2000) find indirect empirical support of the model (and also of the gap between 
private profit and social welfare) by examining voting on congressional trade bills, 
specifically votes over adoption of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) 
in 1994. The authors find evidence that organized labor’s political contributions lead to 
votes against freer trade while the political contributions of organized business lead to 
votes in favor of freer trade, controlling for factors such as district characteristics and 
economic conditions. Their analysis suggests that capture and rent seeking occur not only 
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 The former posits incumbent politicians while the latter posits competing interest groups. 
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within regulatory institutions themselves (see Peltzman (1976) and Laffont and Tirole 
(1991) who extend Stigler’s (1971) original insight), but also at the level of the legislative 
and administrative apparatus of the State (McCubbins, Noll, and Weingast 1987; Hall and 
Wayman 1990; Huber and Shipan 2002). In addition to generating negative collective 
economic costs, lobbying the political process is also highly inefficient.  
A second set of examples involves the sphere of domestic finance, which 
highlights again the divergence between private profit and social welfare. Igan, Mishra, 
and Tressel (2011) find that one class of lobbying targeted the relaxation of rules in order 
to allow increased risk-taking (contributing to systemic collective cost) in the mortgage 
lending industry, specifically in the period prior to the 2008 crisis. The research presents 
a connection between politically active financial players and systemic risk that makes 
financial crises and resulting bailouts more likely. This socialization of risk – a classic 
collective action problem – is highly profitable to financial firms and their top executives 
personally, as research by Skaife, Veenman, and Werner (2013) demonstrates. This latter 
research finds that a firms lobbying intensity increases CEO compensation (i.e., private 
gain), while leaving shareholder value (i.e., social welfare) unaffected. The authors 
conclude that shareholders shoulder the costs of lobbying, resulting in privatized gains 
and distributed losses. This incentivizes other types of lobbying, institutionalizing it as a 
means to maintaining a competitive edge. Instead of stabilizing the economy, financial 
intermediation in conjunction with dysfunctional institutions can promote steep collective 
and systemic costs. Once socialized risk become an essential part of profit making, 
private agents are locked in a socially suboptimal Nash equilibrium, requiring an external 




Treasury – in order to coordinate successful collective action with respect to these 
systemic economic costs. However, once lobbying is institutionalized, the regulation 
administered is likely to be highly contested. Richard Green has suggested that the recent 
“Dodd-Frank” financial legislation can be beneficial for large firms seeking to reduce 
risk, but its ongoing robustness remains uncertain. Indeed, the solutions detailed by 
experts to “once again make the financial system safe, simple, and boring (Green 2014, 
p.38)” remain today highly contested by those with political power who have profits at 
stake. 
One reason for the contested nature of regulatory policy is because much of the 
literature in economics has perceived the re-regulatory trend occurring after 1980 as a 
problem associated with too much government (Feldstein 1980; Olson 1982; Ferguson 
2013, Schuck 2014) in contrast to a failure of markets and institutions (i.e., the 
ineffectiveness of the commitment device). If the State and its regulatory apparatus are 
not impartial with respect to private interests, political intervention in the economy can be 
described as inefficient at best and a waste at worst (Przeworski 1990, p.23).  It is thus 
not too surprising that the increased opportunistic re-regulation of markets occurring after 
1980 (Block and Somers 2014; Dumenil and Levy 2011) was perceived as a capture of a 
government grown too large and complex (for an example of this view, see especially 
Olson 1982 or Ferguson 2013). When regulation is malleable and thus partial, any 
increase in regulation’s scope or intensity can cause economic actors to attempt to shift 
their regulatory burden onto the commons or onto others. When some gain and others 
lose, it is the shifting of regulatory burden that is viewed as a capture of the regulatory 




can hold individuals to their enlightened self-interest in the face of intense economic 
competition.  
 
4.2 State Capture 
The wedge between private and public interests due to porous regulation and 
agency capture can best be seen, however, in developing and transition economies. 
Transition economies or economies with substantial State capture face two basic issues 
that restrict economic growth, one market-related and the other institutional. First, the 
political organization of the State is often so weak as to be easily captured; this represents 
the institutional failure. A lack of effective political organization means that regulatory 
institutions are not neutral and therefore do not have sufficient coercive force to provide 
impartial “rules of the game” for markets. This exacerbates the second basic issue, in 
which attempts to privatize State-owned enterprises have the unintended consequences of 
shifting economic organization from public-order to corrupt private-order (i.e., mafia) 
institutions, as was the case in the former U.S.S.R. in the 1990s. Collective contributions 
to basic public goods plummet, leading to still weaker political organization. 
The recent literature on State capture provides clear evidence supporting this 
observation. Economic opportunism in these countries is incentivized through a weak 
political and regulatory apparatus in which public officials are captured by private 
interests and unable to act in the public interest. According to a recent empirical study, 
“private gains to capture are associated with substantial social costs in capture economies 
both in terms of overall economic performance and with regard to the capacity or 




market economy” (Hellman et al. 2003, p.770, italics added). The authors suggest that 
capture shifts the cost of investment in public goods from large firms to smaller firms and 
to the broader public. This cost shifting represents a negative externality in itself, but it 
also creates additional negative externalities by incentivizing all around political and 
economic opportunism. In a related empirical study, Slinko et al. (2002) find evidence 
that, among other costs, one of the foremost negative externalities imposed by cost 
shifting is decreased social spending on public goods – a salient example of the 
divergence between private and public interests. When contrasted with the descriptive 
evidence found in the CED report of 1971, the Chicago and the Virginia view of 
regulation remain incomplete. The State capture literature, on the other hand, 
emphasizing a failure of markets as well as institutions, is more consistent with the 
report’s conclusions. 
One final example to be explored concerns regulation of the conditions of labor 
and employment in an economy. The CED report devoted considerable space detailing 
the potential efforts the business community could undertake “to improve [the way] the 
over-all American system is working so that a better quality of life can be achieved for 
the entire citizenry” (CED 1971, p.13). The efforts its authors listed directly affect work 
and labor, which the report framed as a series of collective goods continually subject to 
over-extraction. Listed in bullet points in the original report, these collective goods 
included,  
elimination of poverty and provision of good health care; equal 
opportunity for each person to realize his or her full potential regardless of 
race, sex, or creed; education and training for a fully productive and 
rewarding participation in modern society; ample jobs and career 
opportunities in all parts of society; livable communities with decent 




transportation, good cultural and educational opportunities, and a 
prevailing mood of civility among people (CED 1971, p.13). 
 
Why did the authors of the CED report view labor as a common resource, and why is 
impartial regulation of this resource important to the capitalist class?  
In the “tragedy of the commons,” Hardin (1968) suggested that if there is a 
resource that must replenish itself, competition will often lead to its overuse and ultimate 
deterioration. A related element of the tragedy for Hardin is the inefficient use of time 
and energy in the pursuit of using/extracting this resource faster or more extensively than 
others, an issue described by a “Tullock auction” (e.g., Tullock 1967). An important 
contribution made by Marx to the economics literature was to shift the focus toward 
abstract labor power as the source of value in production.
36
 The productive capacity 
embodied in labor power is a collective good, analogous to the productive capacity of a 
natural resource. In contrast to a natural resource, however, it is the education and 
physical health of labor power that contribute to economic productivity, which must find 
support and protection from over-extraction. The ability to husband this resource is in the 
enlightened self-interest of individual capitalists because its opportunistic overuse 
imposes a collective cost on all capitalists. Marx’s observation that there must be 
“equality of restraint on the exploitation of labour (Marx 1992, p.621)” runs parallel to 
those same observations made in the CED report of 1971.   
Of course, without property rights over labor power or regulation of its 
opportunistic overuse, the incentive for the individual capitalist is to externalize these 
costs to the commons. Hardin’s proposed solution to the tragedy was in establishing 
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“mutual coercion mutually agreed upon” (Hardin 1968) with clearly articulated property 
rights. From the perspective of the capitalist class, however, property rights over labor 
power are an inefficient solution (because of the misalignment of interests between owner 
and slave), and socialism is not a viable alternative as it threatens capitalists’ collective 
ownership of the means of production. This basic tension underlies today’s 
market/institutional failure. An over-reliance on the market mechanism without an 
impartial third-party to regulate competition and to support enlightened self-interest 
means that few will voluntarily contribute to social goods and share collective costs.  
Concretely, this becomes a question of how the capitalist class prevents some of 
its members from imposing costs on the rest through the degradation of labor power to 
enhance profit. The solution detailed by Marx was economic legislation and regulation – 
determined endogenously by class conflict – and from there a transition to a new mode of 
production. Yet, the answer to this question may also hinge on the autonomy of the 
regulatory apparatus from capitalists themselves. This characteristic is explored from an 







MEASURING THE RELATIVE AUTONOMY OF THE STATE 
 
The core theoretical concept of the relative autonomy of the State is explored 
from an empirical perspective in this chapter. The foregoing discussion suggested that 
regulation of market behavior during the golden age was effective in engendering a 
unified capitalist class in part because regulation was robust and credible – a commitment 
device for capitalists such that each shared equally the cost of investment in the social 
commons.  
Descriptive evidence for this view was found in the CED report of 1971, which 
indicated that impartial regulation was beneficial to capitalists because it allowed them to 
act in their enlightened self-interest and refrain from narrow opportunism, among other 
benefits. Even though regulation might have meant lower individual profitability, it was 
collectively beneficial because of the social investment in productivity it engendered. The 
way regulation supported collective action was outlined analytically by defining the 
State’s regulatory apparatus as a commitment device, capable of imposing mutually 
beneficial restrictions on the capitalist class. 
This commitment device was effective during the golden age because the State 
was relatively autonomous from the capitalist class, resistant to efforts of different 






chapter explores. This autonomy ensured that the rules embodied in regulation would be 
enforced, and the threat of sanctioning those inclined to act opportunistically was 
credible. The commitment device increasingly lost its effectiveness after 1980 during the 
neoliberal era as the payoff to acting in one’s enlightened self-interest was overshadowed 
by the increased pursuit of narrow individual opportunism. The unity of the capitalist 
class began to diminish as the State’s autonomy was undermined, and regulation ceased 
to be an effective commitment device. The result was increased re-regulation (described 
earlier as hijacking the rules), which, over a short period in the early 1980s became 
institutionalized as the preferred means to increase low individual profitability. That in 
turn engendered opportunities for some capitalists to obtain short-term economic rents by 
migrating away from regulation or simply skirting the rules altogether. The analytic 
model predicted that re-regulation is profitable in the short run but not in the long run. 
This is because, as Ostrom (2000) suggested, when some are able to evade rules, others 
will become unwilling to cooperate. No longer focused on cooperation, their focus will 
instead be on trying to bend rules in their favor and free ride on the cooperation (social 
investment) of others, which will thereby turn the structure of interaction among 
capitalists into an n-person prisoners’ dilemma (Hardin 1982) and further compromise 
the relative autonomy of the State over time. 
The empirical hypothesis to be explored can be specified compactly as follows. 
Prior to 1980 there is no statistically significant relationship between the profit rate and 
the State (i.e., the State is relatively autonomous), while after 1980 there is a negative 
relationship (i.e., the State is not relatively autonomous). The basic intuition is that 




when everyone follows the rules, or when individuals are punished swiftly for 
opportunism (the case prior to 1980). Cooperation is less likely when the rules can be 
bent in one’s own favor to gain private advantage (the case after 1980).  
This chapter reports empirical findings that are consistent with this hypothesis. 
During the “golden age” of capitalism – or for the purposes of this empirical analysis, the 
period from 1948 to 1980 – the State was effective in aligning private return with social 
welfare because the State’s relative autonomy was intact. This is in contrast to the 
neoliberal era after 1980, which is characterized by the undermining of the State’s 
relative autonomy. In what follows, the two empirical models that are used to 
operationalize this main hypothesis are discussed first, and then the estimation techniques 
and data used are described prior to reporting the test results obtained. 
The first model is based on the simple idea that if the State and its regulatory 
apparatus are relatively autonomous and thus resistant to narrow opportunism, industry 
rates of profit will be invariant to a change in who controls the Executive branch of 
government (and thus a change in the rules of the game), controlling for other variables. 
This idea is grounded in literature that suggests that economic profits have the potential 
to be shaped in large measure by the political party controlling the Executive branch of 
government that is responsible for the administration and application of rules and 
procedures (McCubbins, Noll, and Weingast 1987; Huber and Shipan 2002; Cohen, 
Diether, and Malloy 2012). Put simply, if the State is autonomous, a change in the 
application of rules should have no appreciable influence on profit rates at the industry-
level. By contrast, if the State is not autonomous, a change in the rules will benefit some 




(collective) goods and to share social (collective) costs. 
While the empirical estimates are consistent with the hypothesis tested, a number 
of methodological objections with the data can be raised and are discussed below. The 
second model specification addresses these methodological concerns while at the same 
time making it possible to distinguish the short and long run interaction between the 
profit rate and regulation intensity – one tangible example of the State apparatus.  
 
5.1 Data 
The relationship between the regulatory apparatus of the State and industry level 
profitability in the United States is examined using data spanning a sixty-four year period 
from 1948 to 2012. Data from eleven two-digit NAICS industrial sectors are used to 
calculate rates of profit, which are regressed against changes in the Executive and 
Legislative branches of the United States government. Yearly data from Congressional 
Quarterly Inc. (2013) were collected for the percentage of Democrats in the Senate. Data 
were also collected from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (2014)
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 (BEA henceforth) to 
calculate the before-tax profit rate for each of the following eleven industries: agriculture, 
mining, transportation, utilities, wholesale trade, retail trade, construction, durable goods, 
nondurable goods, services, and finance-insurance-real estate (FIRE). The formula for the 
rate of profit in each industry is 
 
Profit rate = Corporate profits + Nonfarm proprietors’ income + Net interest 
Capital stock 
(15) 
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which are measured at current (replacement) cost in industry i in year t.
38
 Equation (15) 
indicates that the rate of profit is a function of corporate profits, nonfarm proprietors’ 
income, and net interest, each divided by the stock of capital in that industry. In the 
calculated capital stock for the FIRE industry, the stock of private residential household 
fixed assets (found in BEA Table 5.1) was subtracted from the FIRE current-cost net 
stock of private fixed assets. For all industries, the capital stock measure is the current-
cost (in contrast to historical cost) net stock of private fixed assets obtained from BEA 
Table 3.1ESI. The average profit rate is a summation of the elements in equation (15), 
which controls for different sized industries by allowing the separate components to enter 
the profit rate calculation directly as opposed to assuming all industries are equal in size 
and taking the simple average of the final rates of profit.  Table 5.1 displays descriptive 
statistics for the variables, while Appendix B displays the industry profit rates through 
time. Industry rates of profit differ widely both in terms of magnitude and variance. 
 
Table 5.1. Descriptive Statistics 
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 Basu (2013) suggests current cost and historical cost measures converge in the long run. 
Variable/Profit Rate Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Sen Dems 65 54.02 6.89 44.00 68.00
Agriculture 65 5.71 1.56 3.13 8.48
Mining 65 3.92 2.24 -1.28 10.19
Construction 65 70.06 14.36 44.14 107.74
Durable Goods 65 17.81 10.86 1.85 48.95
Nondurable Goods 65 21.16 6.13 11.22 37.72
Transportation 65 4.05 1.87 1.87 9.81
Utilities 65 5.29 1.09 1.60 6.97
Wholesale Trade 65 53.19 32.03 19.85 137.41
Retail Trade 65 35.89 16.95 13.64 78.27
FIRE 65 21.12 3.67 10.88 27.23
Services 65 18.72 1.97 14.68 21.91
Aggregate 64 18.47 2.23 12.32 23.59




Agriculture, mining, transportation, and utilities have the lowest average profit rate along 
with a substantial amount of variability over time. This is particularly true for mining. 
Construction, wholesale, and retail trade have the highest average profit rate, with a 
general tendency toward decline in the trade industries. The same is true for the 
manufacturing industries – durable goods and nondurable goods –, which have a mid-
range average profit rate. The rate of profit for services is relatively flat over time and has 
an average of close to 20 percent. The finance, insurance, and real estate (FIRE) industry 
has an average profit rate of about 21 percent during the sample with substantial variation 
over time. Figure 5.1 displays two measures of the rate of profit, as well as the percentage 

















5.2 Executive Branch Model 
The Executive branch of government can influence industry-level profitability 
through the administration and application of rules and regulatory policy. If, however, the 
State is relatively autonomous from capitalists, changes in the political composition of 
the Executive branch (and therefore also in the creation and enforcement of rules) should 
have no statistically significant influence on changes in the profit rate at the industry 
level. 
Consider the following simple specification (equation 16), which posits that the 
rate of profit is a function of changes in the political composition of the Executive 
branch, controlling for overall class conflict and macroeconomic conditions.  
 
   Δ ProfitRate = β1(1-D) + β2(D)  
   + β3ΔExecutive*(1-D) + β4ΔExecutive*(D)        (16) 
   + β5Laborshare + β6Outputgap +  e 
 
D is a dummy variable for years greater than or equal to 1980. Δ Executive is a dummy 
variable representing a change in the ideological composition of the Executive branch 
(equal to one if a change occurs, zero otherwise). Laborshare is an index of the labor 
share of total U.S. income and reflects the conflict and relative power balance between 
labor and capital (data from St. Louis Federal Reserve 2014). Outputgap is actual GDP 
divided by potential GDP in 2005 dollars and controls for overall macroeconomic 
conditions and the business cycle (data from St. Louis Federal Reserve 2014). The OLS 




the constant term suppressed. 
Coefficient estimates of this model are displayed in Table 5.2. While not 
conclusive, the results are consistent with the empirical hypothesis. Specifically, results 
indicate that changes in the political composition of the Executive branch of government 
are not associated with changes in the profit rate for any industry prior to 1980. In 
contrast to this, results indicate that after 1980 changes in the political composition of the 
Executive branch of government are associated with changes in the profit rate for the 
Durable goods and FIRE industries.
39
 Overall, the findings are consistent with the central 
hypothesis concerning the State’s relative autonomy prior to 1980 and its lack thereof 
after. 
The coefficient estimates also indicate that labor’s share of national income can 
be a significant negative factor contributing to changes in the profit rate. The following 
industries display a statistically significant (negative) coefficient for this variable, 
meaning that an increase in labor’s share of total income decreases the rate of profit: 
agriculture, durable goods, nondurable goods, transportation, wholesale trade, retail trade, 
and the two broad measures of the profit rate (average and aggregate). This finding 
highlights one potential motivation for U.S. capitalists to seek a larger (global) pool of 
cheap labor and thereby weaken the bargaining power of domestic workers. Korkut 
Erturk suggests in a recent paper that this changed the balance of power between 
capitalists and workers and turned the strategic interaction from a basic prisoners’ 
dilemma into a one-sided prisoners’ dilemma (Erturk 2015). It is one-sided 
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 The sign of the FIRE industry Executive branch coefficient post 1980 is negative, while the sign of the 
durable goods industry Executive branch coefficient post-1980 is positive, a result that is not explored in 























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































because workers do not have sufficient power to retaliate when in competition with a 
global supply of labor.   
The empirical results of this model, while consistent with the hypothesis tested, 
are not conclusive. The main reason these results are not conclusive is that there are only 
two industries for which the State has a statistically significant influence (durable goods 
and FIRE industries) after 1980. A more robust finding would be a relationship in several 
or most of the industries after 1980. Despite this, however, the results support the State’s 
relative autonomy prior to 1980, and are indicative that it may not be relatively 
autonomous in certain industries for the neoliberal era after 1980. 
Another difficulty here is that there might be other ways to measure the State 
apparatus. For instance, changes in regulation intensity can be a tangible example of how 
political influence is exerted in the economy. There is no easy way, however, to measure 
regulation or its intensity (Levi-Faur 2011). This is the main problem scholars in the 
regulation capture literature have run in to in defining and measuring regulation and its 
capture (Carpenter and Moss 2013; Carpenter 2013). In the absence of any direct 
measure, various proxy variables can be considered as a second-best option.   
One particular proxy variable can be motivated through the strand of regulation 
capture literature that focuses on legislative capture, also called capture in statute 
(McCubbins et al. 1987; Hall and Wayman 1990; Huber and Shipan 2002). This strand of 
literature suggests that the preferences of politically powerful economic actors can be 
hard-wired into legislative-based regulatory statutes. For instance, McCubbins et al. 
suggest that “political actors stack the deck in favor of constituents who are the intended 




that the outcomes will be responsive to the constituents that the policy is intended to 
favor” (Mccubbins et al. 1987, p.261, italics in original). By contrast, if the State is 
instead relatively autonomous, outcomes (i.e., differential profits) must not be 
“responsive to the constituents.” 
Thus, one possible proxy for the regulation intensity of the State can be the 
percentage of Democrats in the U.S. Senate.
40
 Similar to views expressed in national 
surveys (Swift 2013), the Democratic Party is quite often associated with increased 
economic regulation of markets within the academic literature (e.g., Teske 2004, p.129) 
on a host of issues ranging from labor markets (Gregory and Katz 1979) to the 
environment (Revesz 1997), and from international trade (Baldwin and Magee 2000) to 
health care (Navarro et al. 2006). The second model below thus assumes that an increase 
in the percentage of Democrats in the U.S. Senate is an indicator of increased regulation 
intensity at the margin over an indeterminate time horizon, and examines how it is related 
to industry profit rates. 
 
5.3 Legislative Branch Model 
There are three main complications to consider when using time series data of the 
type in this research. Discussed in detail below, these complications include (i) the 
direction of causality between variables; (ii) the potential for spurious regression (a type 
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 Some may object to the use of this variable as a proxy citing the changing nature of the Democratic Party 
over time. While it is true that there has been an electoral shift on social issues (that are temporally and 
geographically dispersed), the Party's relationship to economic regulation has remained relatively constant. 
The social issues alluded to include the Dixiecrat movement in the late 1940s, the “southern strategy” in the 
late 1960s into the 1970s, and the “Reagan Democrats” of the Northeastern U.S. in the 1970s and 1980s. 
Statistical tests with respect to the year of structural break indicate a change in the relationship between 




of false causation) caused by nonstationary time series;
41
 and (iii) potentially cointegrated 
time series (a type of common drift).  
The first complication concerns the direction of causality among variables, or the 
way in which changes in the dependent variables are “caused” by changes in the 
independent variables. Peter Kennedy suggested that although it is not possible to 
determine statistical causality using the dictionary definition of the term, “Granger 
developed a special definition of causality which econometricians use in place of the 
dictionary definition” (Kennedy 2003, p.74), one that usually implies “precedence.” 
Bivariate Granger-causality tests indicate that for at least two industries (agriculture and 
transportation) the direction of Granger-causality between the rate of profit and Senate 
Democrats percentage could run in either direction.
42
 This mix of causality between 
economic and political variables is consistent with prior literature (e.g., Volscho and 
Kelly 2012). According to Poulantzas (1973), the economic sphere (i.e., the profit rate) 
determines the political sphere (i.e., Senate Democrats) “in the last instance.” Poulantzas’ 
contention was that the economic determines the political through the structural 
relationships in a particular mode of production. 
In analyzing economic time series, it is also important to distinguish whether each 
series is stationary or nonstationary.
43
 Ordinary regression models – like those previously 
depicted – have the potential to be misleading when regressed variables are 
nonstationary, what is known in the literature as spurious regression (Granger and 
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 “A nonstationary series is said to be integrated of order d, denoted I(d), if it becomes stationary after 
being first differenced d times (Greene 2007, p.740).”  
42
 Dickey-Fuller unit root test with trend are listed in Appendix A. 
43
 Nonstationary series are known also as integrated or unit-root. Stationary time series have a fixed mean 





Newbold 1974). William Greene defines the problem of nonstationarity as follows.  
In single time-series analysis […] it has long been recognized that 
estimated regression relations can be distorted by nonstationarity in the 
data. What appear to be persistent and strong regression relationships can 
be entirely spurious and due to underlying characteristics of the time-
series process rather than actual connections among the variables (Greene 
2007, p.243). 
 
This second complication – spurious regression caused by nonstationarity – is commonly 
assessed in the literature (e.g., Volscho and Kelly 2012) using Dickey-Fuller (1979) unit 
root tests with trend. This type of statistical test explores the extent to which the data are 
stationary (no unit root) or nonstationary (unit root). Greene suggested “[t]he Dickey-
Fuller procedures have stood the test of time as robust tools that appear to give good 
results over a wide range of applications” (Greene 2008, p.753).  
For several variables – including Senate Democrats percentage, many of the 
individual industry profit rates, and the aggregate profit rate – Dickey-Fuller unit root 
tests indicate that the presence of a unit root (that is, nonstationarity) cannot be rejected. 
This is the case for Senate Democrats (t = -2.9) and for the aggregate profit rate (t = -2.4) 
– the critical value for both is -3.49. The test statistics indicate a mix of stationary and 
nonstationary variables, which means the potential for spurious regression must be 
recognized and empirically assessed. Theoretical and empirical research on the tendency 
of the profit rate to fall over time (e.g., Li et al. 2007; Basu and Manolakos 2013) 
indicates that questions of stationarity with respect to the profit rate cannot be easily 
dismissed. 
One way to account for the problem of spurious regression is to use the first 
difference of the time series in question. This method is not always ideal, however, 




Engle and Granger (1987) suggested that cointegrated time series data (the third 
complication) can be thought of as adjusting to each other over time through short and 
long-run relationships and proposed a two-step error-correcting method for its correction. 
Engle-Granger cointegration tests indicate that the null hypothesis of “no cointegration” 
cannot be rejected in several variables; Appendix A lists these statistics. An inability to 
reject the null hypothesis means there might be some long-term, potentially equilibrating 
underlying common process between variables. Recent empirical work studying the 
intersection of politics and economics (e.g., Volscho and Kelly 2012, p.687) tend to 
utilize an error-correction methodology to account for such underlying processes.  
Because of these empirical concerns, a standard OLS specification that motivates 
the discussion is followed by a system of equations error-correction model (ECM) of the 
relationship between Senate Democrats (regulation intensity) and the rate of profit. The 
ECM addresses issues of causality and spurious regression that might prevent accurate 
interpretation of the standard OLS estimates (Engle and Granger 1987). The ECM does 
so by simultaneously estimating the relationship as a long-run error correction process 
across both the economic and political spheres, with short-run adjustment coefficients 
indicating any disequilibrium dynamics.  
The previous model was an attempt to assess the relative autonomy of the State 
through the statistical relationship between industry-level profit rates and changes in the 
political composition of the Executive branch of government. Yet because the State’s 
influence on the profit rate can occur through other mechanisms or be spread across 
several years or decades, its impact does not take place exclusively through (short-run) 




industries is also channeled through Congressional committee assignments and leadership 
and the drafting and implementation of regulatory policy, among other channels.  
The basic least squares relationship between Senate Democrats (s) and the 
average profit rate (π) can be specified as in equation (17). A scatter plot with a fitted 
OLS regression line (coefficients found in equation 18) is displayed in Figure 5.2. 
 
 πt = β0 + β1*st + u             (17) 
 
With sixty-five yearly observations the estimated coefficients of equation (17) using 
robust standard errors are 
 
 πt = 12.2 + .07st + ut            (18) 
   
 




The intercept coefficient estimate (β0 = 12.2) is statistically significant at the 99 percent 
level (t=7.57) and the slope coefficient estimate (β1 = .07) is significant at the 90 percent 
level (t=2.57). This simple regression specification, however, does not address the 
difference that may exist between different periods (partitions) in the data. By 
partitioning the data into two periods, this potential difference in estimated slope can be 
isolated. The structure of this two-period regression model (with the constant term 
suppressed) can be specified as in equation (19). 
 
 πt  = β1 (1-D) + β2(1-D)st + β3(D)st + β4(D)  (19) 
 
D is a dummy variable for years greater than or equal to 1980. With the same sixty-five 
yearly observations, the estimated coefficients of equation (19) using robust standard 
errors are  
 
 πt = 16.03(1-D) + .02(1-D)st - .09(D)st  + 19.57(D) (20) 
 
The pre-1980 and post-1980 dummy terms are significant at the 99 percent level (t=7.46 
and t=7.94, respectively). The pre-1980 slope coefficient estimate (β2=.02) is not 
statistically significant (t=.57), while the post-1980 slope coefficient estimate (β3= -.09) 
is significant at the 90 percent level (t= -1.73). These slope estimates reflect the 
differences in slope that exist in the relationship prior to and after 1980, as seen in Figure 
5.3. As described above, a Dickey-Fuller (1979) unit-root test on the residuals indicates 





Figure 5.3: Pre- and post-1980 partitioned data with fitted OLS regression lines. 
 
profit rates as well as for Senate Democrats (test statistics listed in Appendix A). This is 
indicative of a potential for cointegrated time series, as well as spurious regression. 
 
5.4 Two-equation System Error-correction Model 
An error correction model is superior to the previous specifications because it is 
less likely to reflect spurious regression when using both nonstationary and cointegrated 
data. The following two-equation error-correction model is a simple representation of the 
interaction between the average profit rate (π) and Senate Democrats (S; regulation 
intensity). One interpretation of this model is that there is a long-run relationship between 
π and S (the solid sloped lines in the diagrams that follow), plus a short-run 
disequilibrium adjustment captured by αi (the directional arrows in the diagrams that 
follow). A two equation simultaneous system ECM can be represented as 
 
                 (21) 
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where π is the average rate of profit, αi is the error correction rate (i.e., how quickly and 
in what direction adjustment back to equilibrium is made),  D is a dummy variable 
indicating years 1980 and later, and S is the percentage of Democrats in the U.S. Senate. 
The long-run relationships are captured by the second set of parenthesis, which is the 
disequilibrium between the rate of profit and Senate Democrats (regulation intensity).  
The model passes all the conventional tests for autocorrelation, residual normality, and 
heteroskedasticity. Iterative OLS coefficient estimates for this two-equation model are 
 
                                                                                                                              (22) 
 
The signs of the adjustment coefficients α1 and α2 of equation (22) indicate that the 
system is dynamically unstable (refer to Figure 5.4). Economic adjustment, α1, is not 
statistically significant (t=.06), while political adjustment, α2, is significant at the 95 
percent level (t= -2.01). Dummy terms β1 and β4 are significant at the 99 percent level 
(t=2.71 and t=2.71, respectively). The pre-1980 slope coefficient (β2 = -.43) is not 
statistically significant (t=-1.61), while the post-1980 slope coefficient (β3 = -.84) is 
significant at the 90 percent level (t= -1.99). These estimates are summarized and 
portrayed in Figure 5.4. To understand the short-run dynamics of the system, suppose 
there is a positive disequilibrium (that is, a point above either of the solid sloped lines) in  
the profit rate-Senate Democrats relationship, such as might occur at point “A.” The 
estimated alpha coefficients (α1 =.005 and α2 = -.5) from equation (22) indicate that the 
short-run adjustment process is unstable, meaning that the system does not converge back 
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Figure 5.4. Two equation ECM with short-run adjustment coefficients 
 
to equilibrium. 
To see why, notice that a positive disequilibrium at point “A” corresponds with an 
increase in the profit rate (a positive sign for α1) at the same time as the percentage of 
Democrats decreases (a negative sign for α2). The reverse is true if the disequilibrium is 
negative (that is, a point below the solid sloped lines). In terms of long-run 
characteristics, the estimates suggest that there is a difference in slope between time 
period subsets (i.e., a difference between β2 and β3) in the data sample corresponding to 
the year 1980. Prior literature on the profit rate supports this idea, suggesting that near the 
year 1980 there was a transition to a new strand of capitalism known as neoliberalism 
(Shaikh and Tonak 1994, p.122ff; Dumenil and Levy 2011). Neoliberal capitalism is 
characterized by a series of political and economic changes that (temporarily) halted a 
fall in the profit rate. From an empirical perspective, one way to determine the optimal 
year for use as a structural-break dummy variable is to minimize the determinant of the 




Figure 5.5, indicate that 1980 is the optimal year for use as a structural break. One 
drawback therefore of equation (21) is that it does not contain partitioned short-run 
disequilibrium adjustment coefficient estimates (alphas) for years prior to as well as after 
1980. To remedy this, the second iteration of the model separates the short-run alpha 
coefficients to include both pre- and post-1980 periods. This method will then provide 
estimates of the disequilibrium rate of adjustment separately for both periods for each 
equation. 
 
5.5 Two-equation System ECM with Separate Short-run Adjustments 
This second specification of the error-correction model uses separate adjustment 
coefficients to identify not only whether the slope coefficients change across periods, but 
also whether the direction of disequilibrium adjustment changes across periods. Again 





















           (23) 
 
The only change between equation (21) and (23) lies within the first set of parenthesis, 
which is the now partitioned short-run disequilibrium readjustment process, represented 
by the αi coefficients. D is again a dummy variable for years greater than or equal to 
1980. Similar to equation (21), the long-run relationships lie within the second set of 
parenthesis, which is the disequilibrium between the rate of profit and Senate Democrats 
(regulation intensity). π is the average rate of profit and S is Senate Democrats 
percentage. The estimated OLS coefficients of equation (23) are 
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                                                                                                                                         (24) 
 
The long-run slope coefficients estimates displayed in equation (24) remain consistent 
with those estimates in equation (22) in that there is no significant relationship prior to 
1980 and a significant negative relationship after (β3= -.74, t=-1.67). The short-run 
adjustment estimates also continue to indicate that the system is dynamically unstable 
prior to 1980. To see why, notice from equation (24) that α1=.02 has a positive sign, 
while α3= -.41 has a negative sign. This means that prior to 1980, a negative 
disequilibrium (point A in Figure 5.6) corresponds with a decrease in the profit rate and 
an increase in the percentage of Democrats in the Senate.  
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Figure 5.6. Two equation ECM with partitioned short-run adjustment coefficients. 
 
By partitioning the short-run adjustment coefficients, it can also be seen that the 
system becomes dynamically stable after 1980. To see why, notice from equation (24) 
that α2= -.005 is negative, and α4= -.57 is also negative. This means that a negative 
disequilibrium after 1980 (point B in Figure 5.6) corresponds with an increase in the 
profit rate and an increase in the percentage of Democrats. The reverse is true for a 
positive disequilibrium. In terms of statistical significance, although the post-1980 
adjustment coefficients α2 (t=-1.19) and α4 (t=-1.59) have higher levels of statistical 
significance than do the pre-1980 coefficients α1 (t=.17) and α3 (t=-.04), the post-1980 
coefficients are not statistically significant even at the 90 percent level. The estimates 
found in equation (24) can be summarized as portrayed in the following diagram. The 
empirical estimates behind Figure 5.6 indicate that prior to 1980 the short run relationship 
between the profit rate and Senate Democrats percentage is unstable (point A). That is, 




U.S. Senate or with changes in the profit rate prior to 1980. 
Technically, this means that even small deviations from long-run equilibrium tend 
not to converge, but in practice, this can be interpreted to mean that changes in regulation 
intensity do not alter the profit rate prior to 1980. In addition, after 1980 the data suggest 
that the system becomes dynamically stable (that is, tends to converge back to 
equilibrium) in the short-run (point B). This means that after 1980 – assuming that 
individual level changes are also reflected at the aggregate level – it is at least possible to 
increase profitability through influencing or changing regulation intensity (i.e., to re-
regulate in one’s favor) in the short-run, but this is negative in the long run. Putting this 
result in terms of the main hypothesis, an increase in regulation’s intensity could remedy 
a low rate of profit only in the short-run, similar to the type of reactionary regulation that 
is a common solution to crises today. In the long run, however, an increase in regulation 
intensity is associated with lower average profitability after 1980. Compare the analytic 
result from chapter three with point B in Figure 5.6; deregulation can be profitable in the 
short run, but in the long run it makes collective action much more problematic. 
Although the analysis lies at the level of the average profit rate for eleven major 
U.S. industries, the empirical estimates obtained are consistent with the central 
hypothesis that the State is relatively autonomous prior to but not after 1980. This 
interpretation rests on four related empirical findings. The first of these findings is a 
dynamically unstable short-run relationship between the profit rate and Senate Democrats 
prior to 1980, represented by the arrows in the left-hand side of Figure 5.6. The second 
finding is a dynamically stable short-run relationship after 1980, represented by the 




1980 long-run relationship, represented by a horizontal sloped line in the left side of 
Figure 5.6. Finally, there is a statistically significant post-1980 long-run relationship, 
represented by a negative sloped line in the right side of Figure 5.6. 
 
5.6 Application to the FIRE Industry 
 It is difficult, however, to gauge the degree to which profitability in particular 
industries is reflected at the level of average profitability of all eleven industries. For 
example, a change in regulation intensity may induce a rise in profitability in one 
industry at the same time as an equivalent fall in profitability in another, offsetting a 
change in overall average profitability. Although an unlikely scenario (in part due to the 
method of calculation of the profit rates), this does represent a complication that might 
cast doubt on the interpretation of the estimates. To address this concern, the model is 
next applied to one of these eleven industries, the FIRE industry. 
The finance-insurance-real estate industry occupies an important position in U.S. 
capitalism (Dumenil and Levy 2011), and is one industry in which the capitalist class is 
likely to be most difficult to unify because of the liquid nature of its capital stock and its 
focus on re-regulation after 1980 (Green 2012, 2014). In order to avoid falling behind 
others, opportunistic re-regulation through lobbying and other types of political influence 
became essential to maintaining a competitive edge.  
 Applying the above-developed empirical methodology to the FIRE sector can 
shed light on the relationship between the profit rate and Senate Democrats in this 
particularly influential sector of the economy and allay concerns with respect to the 




(24), the estimated coefficients using the FIRE sector profit rate (π) and Senate 
Democrats (S) are found in equation (25). 
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     (25) 
 
The signs of the adjustment coefficients (α1 through α4) of equation (25) indicate that the 
system of equations is dynamically unstable prior to 1980 but dynamically stable after 
(see Figure 5.7), which is consistent with the central hypothesis and with empirical 
estimates found in equation (24) above. α1, α2, and α3 are not statistically significant 
(t=.35, t= -.74, and t=.90, respectively).  The post-1980 political adjustment coefficient, 
α4, is statistically significant at the 90 percent level (t=-1.85). This coefficient can be  
interpreted to mean that changes in regulation intensity can return the FIRE rate of profit 
 
 




to its negatively sloped long run equilibrium after 1980 but not before. The pre-1980 
slope coefficient (β2 = 1.87) is not statistically significant (t=1.16) and the post-1980 
slope coefficient (β3 = -1.20) is significant at the 90 percent level (t= -1.69). These 
coefficient estimates can be summarized and portrayed as in Figure 5.7. In this 
application to the FIRE industry, the empirical estimates (found in equation (25)) are 
consistent with the central hypothesis that the State is relatively autonomous prior to but 
not after 1980. 
 
5.7 Empirical Summary 
This chapter has been an empirical assessment of the State’s relative autonomy. 
Two models of the relationship between the State and industry level profitability were 
developed in this chapter. The first model assessed the relative autonomy of the State 
before and after 1980 in terms of the effect of the Executive branch of government on 
industry-level profitability. Results of this model suggest that changes in the Executive 
Branch of government do not correspond with statistically significant changes in the rate 
of profit for any industry prior to 1980, but do so in two industries after. This is 
consistent with the State’s hypothesized relative autonomy prior to 1980, and consistent 
with but not conclusive with respect to its lack of relative autonomy after 1980. The 
estimates also indicate that the aggregate distribution of income (i.e., class conflict) 
between capitalists and workers is an important underlying factor in changes in the rate of 
profit for a majority of the industries in the sample. This empirical finding supports 
recent theoretical work on the changing nature of class conflict in a globalized economy 




The second model – a simultaneous-system error-correction model of the 
Legislative Branch of government – was an attempt to assess the long-run equilibrium 
relationship and short-run adjustment dynamics between Senate Democrats (a proxy for 
the intensity of regulation) and average profitability of capitalists, as well as an 
application of the model to a specific industry (FIRE). Results suggest that the 
relationship is statistically different before and after 1980 in terms of the short-run 
dynamics and in the long-run slope estimates. In particular, estimates suggest that the 
relationship between average profitability and Senate Democrats is both flat and 
dynamically unstable prior to 1980, consistent with a relatively autonomous State. After 
1980, this relationship is negative and dynamically stable, which is consistent with a lack 
of relative autonomy of the State. The application of the model to the FIRE industry is 
also consistent with these results, as well as with results of the Executive branch model. 
The empirical results of each model, however, are not conclusive, and future work should 








This dissertation has argued that despite intense economic competition during the 
golden age of capitalism, autonomous regulatory institutions of the State functioned as a 
commitment device allowing capitalists to act in their enlightened (as opposed to narrow 
opportunistic) self-interest. The autonomy of regulatory institutions was undermined 
around 1980, and with it, the State’s capacity to organize the collective interests of the 
capitalist class was eroded. 
The hypothesis was assessed using descriptive, game-theoretic, and empirical 
methods. By revisiting the theory of the State, the organizational capacity of regulatory 
institutions with respect to the agency of the capitalist class was articulated. Building on 
prior literature, the political organization of the State was described as a club preventing 
free riding on collective contributions to club goods. That is, it excludes those outside the 
club from sharing benefits and precludes those inside the club from free riding on the 
cooperation of others. Yet for the club to be effective, the State’s regulatory institutions 
must be both neutral and have the ability to maintain credible boundaries to impose 
sanctions on those acting opportunistically. The autonomy of these regulatory institutions 
was undermined around 1980, changing the strategic interaction among capitalists from 






payoff to opportunistic defection was comparatively higher. Factors contributing to the 
porous nature of regulatory boundaries included the rapid deregulation of several 
industrial sectors in conjunction with the institutionalization of a market-dictated 
approach to Statecraft (as embodied in the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978). The 
downward regulatory harmonization subsequently engendered compromised the ability of 
regulation to sanction free riders, which further incentivized opportunism and led to 
increased tax evasion and a race to the bottom by members of the capitalist class to skirt 
regulation and the costs they collectively shared. Since 1980, these collective costs – 
environmental, financial, and social – have been on the rise due to a failure of markets 
and institutions in their resolution. This historical depiction was formalized in a game-
theoretic model. Theoretical predictions of the model indicate that the intensity of 
regulation functions as a commitment device for agents, which also determines the level 
of overall cooperation. Deregulation can be profitable for select players in the short run, 
but in the long run it makes acting collectively much more problematic. 
 Two empirical models were also developed to assess the main arguments. The 
first was a short-run OLS time-series model of the Executive branch of government and 
the rate of profit at the industry-level. Estimates of the model support the hypothesis that 
the State was relatively autonomous prior to 1980. Though not conclusive, estimates 
indicate the State lacked autonomy after 1980. The second model employed a two-
equation simultaneous-system error-correction model developed to estimate the long-run 
equilibrium relationship and short-run adjustment dynamics between the intensity of 
regulation and industry profitability. Empirical estimates of this second model are 




was not after. The empirical findings also support predictions from the analytic model. 
  Future research will extend the theoretical, descriptive, and empirical 
components of this dissertation. In particular, the game-theoretic model can be used as a 
framework to assess regulatory policy. The linear expected payoff functions represent 
“levers” that policymakers can utilize to change the behavior of groups by altering 
individual incentives. This study examined one such lever in particular, the effect of 
regulation’s intensity on the relative payoff to opportunistic behavior. Three policy levers 
not explored in depth in this research included means to increase the payoff to 
cooperation (such as through tax incentives or transfers), decreasing the payoff to 
defection, and increasing the sucker’s payoff. Moving each of these levers in the desired 
way can increase the percentage of agents willing to cooperate over time. Dynamic 
simulations of the game-theoretic model can also shed light on how a given set of payoffs 
contribute to group selection (c.f. Simon, Fletcher, and Doebeli 2013).
44
 This in turn can 
inform the set of policy choices with respect to the particular policy lever on which to 
focus, given a set of political and time constraints.  
The game-theoretic model can also be extended to include different forms of time 
discounting. Different forms and rates of discounting will shift the expected payoff 
functions and can be incorporated as an approximation of informal norms or behavior in 
order to match more precisely those in regulated industries. Varying the rate at which 
future payoffs are discounted can also change their slope and functional form (i.e., linear 
versus nonlinear), which, in turn, shifts the equilibrium cooperation boundary. 
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 A link to a video of such simulations, titled Simulation of the evolution of cooperation by group 





The State’s relative autonomy, which is a necessary condition for credible (and 
thus effective) regulation, will be tested in an alternative way utilizing data on lobbying 
expenditures and the rate of profit during two separate periods, 1951 to 1966 and from 
1997 to the present. The empirical model of Chapter 5 can also be used in case studies of 
individual industries, in exploring the effects of political business cycles in different 
industries, or to examine trends in the industry-level rate of profit over time. Dynamic 
simulations of this model can also be estimated in order to ascertain the extent to which 
there is a convergence to equilibrium in the long run between the rate of profit and Senate 
Democrats.  
Recent work on regulatory capture by Carpenter and Moss (2013) suggest that a 
large empirical gap exists in the literature. By developing an analytic and empirical 
methodology for assessing cooperation within the capitalist class and the potential impact 
of the State and regulation on economic profitability at the industry level, this research 
begins to fill this gap. More importantly, however, the question of interest to both 
scholars and policymakers is, with the unraveling of the institutional capacity for 
collective action during the neoliberal era, how can the capitalist State once again save 





















Table A.1: Dickey-Fuller Unit Root and Engle-Granger Cointegration Tests 
 
Dickey-Fuller  Engle-Granger  





Agriculture -1.398 -1.800 
Mining -3.199* -3.237* 
Construction -2.396 -2.284 
Durable goods -2.842 -2.819 
Non Dur. Goods -4.055*** -3.660** 
Transportation -1.930 -0.601 
Utilities -2.518 -1.987 
Wholesale Trade -2.268 -2.937 
Retail Trade -2.249 -3.487** 
FIRE -2.444 -2.847 
Services -1.902 -2.214 
Average Profit Rate -3.566** -3.782** 
Aggregate Profit Rate -2.351 -2.737 
Senate Democrats 
Percent -2.909  - 
(1) With trend. Null Hypothesis: Unit root 





















ΔAgriculture 2.52* 1.32 
ΔMining 0.60 0.58 
ΔConstruction 1.09 0.92 
ΔDurable goods 1.01 0.75 
ΔNon Dur. Goods 1.10 0.90 
ΔTransportation 2.56** 2.44* 
ΔUtilites 1.48 1.10 
ΔWholesale Trade 0.74 0.96 
ΔRetail Trade 0.59 0.42 
ΔFIRE 0.49 0.38 
ΔServices 0.21 0.37 
ΔAvg. Profit Rate 1.75 1.18 
ΔAggregate Profit Rate 1.18 0.95 
Agriculture 0.71 0.68 
Mining 0.09 0.16 
Construction 1.47 0.85 
Durable goods 0.81 0.15 
Non Dur. Goods 0.80 0.21 
Transportation 1.10 0.73 
Utilities 1.58 1.25 
Wholesale Trade 1.00 0.32 
Retail Trade 1.14 0.47 
FIRE 0.19 0.47 
Services 0.37 0.32 
Avg. Profit Rate 0.36 0.15 
Aggregate Profit Rate 0.73 0.44 
Note: Null Hypothesis: Profit rate does not Granger-cause Senate Democrats. 
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